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The objective of this research is to devise a unified method for the distribution of 
pseudonyms in ephemeral hybrid vehicular networks, which are often referred to as 
vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), for the purposes of refill, intra-regional, and inter-
regional movement. This work addresses a significant impediment to the use of 
pseudonyms, which has been almost universally accepted (and is on the verge of being 
standardized by the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) and the 
Society for Automotive Engineers (SAE) as the best means to balance attribution and 
privacy to maximize the value of infrastructure deployment and citizen acceptability (i.e. 
use). The results include a pseudonym distribution protocol that achieves ease of use 
while not compromising the security or privacy pseudonyms afford. These results 
contribute to the solution, in a scalable, adaptive, and bandwidth efficient manner, of one 
of the remaining impediments to the adoption of VANETs. The new method shows 
improved performance compared to a baseline pseudonym distribution method that does 







Human beings have sought to transport themselves and goods since the dawning 
of time. Whether by land, sea, or eventually air and space, transporting physical entities 
has simply been a part of who we are. At the end of the nineteenth century, moving 
analog signals over the radio became a reality. Since the early 1970s, the transporting of 
digital information over a distance has joined the list of things transported in 
contemporary times. In 1999, wireless networking became standardized with the 
ratification of the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11a [1]. 
Thus it is only natural that these two worlds would converge in the utilization of wireless 
communications between vehicles. 
The idea of cars “talking” to each other is not new. In fact the earliest reference to 
this activity is believed to be General Motor’s “GM Futurama” presented during the 1939 
World’s Fair in New York City and featured in their movie To New Horizons. This was a 
mere 31 years after the introduction of Henry Ford’s Model T and about 40 years after 
the invention of radio [2]. In 2006 this prediction for 1960 took a huge leap forward with 
the ratification of the first four members of the family of IEEE 1609 Standards (.1 - .4) 
for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE). Since then networks involving 
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications have been 
coined VANETs (vehicular ad hoc networks) and are also referred to as “Vehicular 
Networks” (VNs). (These two terms will be used interchangeably in this dissertation.) 
Demonstrating a maturation of this effort, the IEEE published ratified full standards to 
the networking (1609.3), multi-channel (1609.4), and electronic payment (1609.11) 
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members of the 1609 family in 2010 and an additional draft document, IEEE 1609.12, to 
standardize the identifiers used in VNs [3]. The entire family of IEEE 1609 standards is 
listed in Table 1 and will be discussed in greater detail below. 
Table 1.  Summary of IEEE 1609 family of standards. 
 
The ephemeral nature of vehicles brings to bear an entirely new set of challenges, 
constraints, and possibilities apart from any other networking paradigm. These will be 
discussed at length in Section 2 of this dissertation along with the security characteristics 
required to bring this emerging technology to market and into the vehicles we drive for 
improved safety (and potentially convenience and infotainment). The work within 
vehicular networks parallels significant developments in the area of autonomous vehicles. 
While VNs stand to improve the ability of drivers by augmenting information available to 
them and possibly automating the response of vehicles to information received, VNs will 
revolutionize autonomous vehicles much as the TCP/IP protocol stack revolutionized the 
personal computer. Thanks to this promising research area, the future looks brighter for 
roadway accident avoidance, driver awareness, and a whole host of VN-enabled 





The desire for safer roads is virtually universal. Drivers, pedestrians, property 
owners, tax payers, and the environment all benefit from fewer accidents and congestion. 
The 2010 traffic safety statistics (the most recent publically available) published by the 
National Highway Safety Administration of the United States Department of 
Transportation paint a generally encouraging picture of roadway safety in the United 
States over the past ten years but still represent a horrific reality of the dangers of driving 
[4, 5]. In 2010, there were 5,419,000 total accidents including 30,196 fatal crashes, 
1,542,000 crashes that resulted in only injuries, and 3,847,000 vehicle accidents that 
resulted in only property damage. A total of 32,885 people lost their lives in vehicle 
accidents in 2010 and another 2,239,000 people were injured [5]. These statistics are 
startling yet they represent the lowest number of traffic fatalities and the second lowest 
number of injuries in the past 10 years as shown in Figure 1. 
 




One interesting aspect of traffic safety is the comparison of urban and rural 
driving statistics. In the United States in 2008 (when a study was conducted for this 
comparison), 15,983 fatalities occurred in urban areas while 20,905 occurred in rural 
areas. This is more significant given only 23 percent of the population lived in rural areas 
at that time [6]. Additional research into the geospatial distribution of vehicle accidents 
and traffic fatalities was conducted by the National Highway Traffic Administration in 
2009. They discovered that 44% of traffic fatalities occurred within urban areas that year 
but if one looked at suburban areas 2.5, 5, 7.5, and 10 miles beyond the urban boundaries, 
this percentage increased to 63%, 73%, 81%, and 86% respectively [7]. This 
disproportion and subsequently greater potential for improved safety in rural areas has 
been recognized by German researchers and caused them to argue that VANETs have an 
even greater contribution to make for those living and travelling in rural and suburban 
areas [8]. 
1.2 Contributions 
The primary contributions of this body of work consist in (a) offering a unified 
framework with novel adjustment for the implementation of a public key infrastructure 
(PKI) adapted for vehicular use and (b) detailing a comprehensive examination of the 
many facets that affect pseudonym (PN) distribution and their impact. 
This research provides a framework that achieves (beyond the standard security 
goals of user-message authentication, user privacy, and message integrity) a workable 
PKI for the VANET environment. Specifically, the presented scheme we developed 
limits the scope of pseudonyms to recycle the key space, distributes PKI administration 
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across regions to reduce storage and processing requirements on the OBU and 
Registration Authority (RA), introduces a method for expanding the coverage of 
VANETs via regions, reduces the size of the certificate revocation list (CRL) needed by a 
vehicle in order to maintain a dynamic network security posture, and reduces the search 
space required to authenticate the sender of a message. Ultimately, such a framework 
provides the proper balance of mobility and privacy. 
Within this framework is developed a protocol used to examine the many factors 
that affect PN distribution. This protocol has been named the PseudoNym Distribution 
Protocol (PNDP). This results in: (1) a unified protocol that can be used for the 
transmission of PNs whether for refill (their reloading as the supply expires), usage 
within a new region under the same CA (intra-regional), or usage within a new region 
under a different CA (inter-regional); (2) the incorporation of control channel and service 
channel intervals and the multiple service channels which are uniquely available to 
networks under the IEEE 1609 standard; (3) the extension of such a protocol across 
multiple RSUs to provide a more scalable solution to the distribution of PNs problem; 
and (4) the inclusion of a control mechanism to prevent endless flooding of PNs in these 
subsequent RSU transmissions. 
Finally, various considerations affecting PN distribution and its modeling were 
investigated. With regards to simulation, proper propagation loss and mobility models 
were examined to provide more realistic results. With regards to PN distribution 
considerations, questions of OBU need, data transmission prioritization, pseudonym pre-
computation, OBU/RSU cooperation, pseudonym forwarding, and layer two protocol 
impact were investigated and those results are presented as well. 
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1.3 Roadmap for Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized to guide the reader through an exploration of the 
topic of vehicular networks which will begin in chapter two. Chapter three then ventures 
into the world of vehicular public key infrastructures (VPKI) including a discussion of 
the many features unique to VANETs. An overview of the simulation method used in this 
thesis is then covered in chapter four with the various scenarios and simulation results 
presented in chapter five. Chapter six synthesizes the results of the various scenarios and 
compares this work to other published methods. The thesis concludes with chapter seven 




VEHICULAR NETWORKS  
2  
2.1 Overview and Historical Development 
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) find their modern beginnings in the 
development of the intelligent transportation system (ITS) in the late 1970’s and 1980’s 
[9]. The core goals of VANETs are: 
1. increased safety on the road, 
2. greater efficiency in the use of the roadways, 
3. decreased negative environmental impact from the use of vehicles on the 
roadways [10, 11]. 
State- and industry sponsored research specific to VANETs has been ongoing for 
some time. An Electronic Route-Guidance Systems (ERGS) was proposed in 1970 within 
the United States by research sponsored by the federal Office of Research and 
Development, Bureau of Public Roads, but was abandoned due to the high cost of its 
infrastructure [12]. The Japanese Agency of Industrial Science and Technology of the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry sponsored the Comprehensive Automobile 
Traffic Control System (CACS) from 1973 to 1979 [13]. However it wasn’t until the 
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) in the United States reserved 75 MHz of 
bandwidth from 5.850 - 5.925 GHz in October of 1999 for Dedicated Short Range 
Communication (DSRC) that a new round of global research and development ignited 
[14]. Figure 2 shows an overview of VANET activities since 1990. The previous US 
effort sponsored by the Department of Transportation (DOT) is known as IntelliDrive, 
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which, in keeping with the traditional goals of VANETs, strived to make driving “safer, 
smarter, and greener” [15]. Since 2010, efforts to develop the technology as well as the 
business case for vehicular networks have only intensified globally. Researchers in 
China, India, and other countries have joined the international effort to increase roadway 
safety. All of these efforts have culminated in the United States DOT’s Research and 
Innovative Technology Administration’s launching of the Connected Vehicle Safety Pilot 
Program, whose vision is to “demonstrate the transformative nature and benefits of 
connected vehicle technologies” and is scheduled to run through the fall of 2013 [16]. 
The automotive industry remains a significant player and has conducted studies to 
determine market penetration and how to convert VANETs into a financially solvent 
proposition. They predict that if all new cars sold were VANET-equipped, a 50% market 
penetration would be achieved within 7.5 years; if only 50% of new cars sold were so 
equipped, the same penetration could take 15 years or more [17]. One of the policy issues 
outside the scope of this research is whether VANETs will be market-driven (like built in 
navigation systems and rear view cameras) or state-mandated (like seat belts and 





Figure 2. VANET research in the United States, Europe, and Japan, source: [13]. 
A VANET consists of a combination of mobile On Board Units (OBUs) which 
are located on the cars and vehicles themselves (including the potential for bicycles and 
pedestrians) and geographically fixed Road Side Units (RSUs, which may come in the 
form of traffic lights, highway lamps, etc) that are interconnected by a backbone network. 
Thus the OBUs only have direct connectivity to other OBUs and RSUs that are within a 
given OBU’s transmission range (approximately 1000 ft maximum [18], however 
methods have been offered to decrease the range (“adaptive transmit power” and 
Distributed Fair Transmit Power Adjustment for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (D-FPAV)) 
and transmission rate (“rate control”) in order to increase the number of active 
participants, such as in [11, 19]). While the RSUs have the ability for “always on” 
Internet access, the OBUs Internet access cannot be assumed to exist. A series of 
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standards and draft standards govern VANETs while a non-trivial amount of research 
continues to push its development further to an installed reality.  
Figure 3 illustrates the various standards that contribute to defining VANET 
operation, each of which will now be discussed. Of particular note is the support within 
VANETs of two distinct upper-layer protocol stacks. On the left is the unique WAVE 
Short Message Protocol (WSMP) stack that provides for smaller and quicker message 
exchange and is envisioned for safety-oriented applications. For non-safety related 
applications, WAVE supports the standard Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) network 
layer with traditional transport layer support as shown on the right of Figure 3.  
 





































2.1.1 Physical and Data Link Layers (IEEE 802.11p, 1609.4, and 802.2) 
The frequency utilization of VANETs was originally outlined in an ASTM 
International standard for DSRC based upon the general IEEE 802.11 standard. This 
work was codified as ASTM E2213-03 in 2003 and has since been incorporated into 
IEEE Standard 802.11p. This standard specifies the use of orthogonal frequency division 
multiplexing (OFDM) with a nominal bandwidth of 10 MHz (Regulatory Class 17 in the 
United States and Regulatory Class 14 in Europe); although 5 and 20 MHz channel 
bandwidths are supportable) [20]. Thus the 75 MHz allocated for DSRC is divided into 7 
channels, the first three being service channels (SCH), followed by the control channel 
(CCH), and three additional service channels, as illustrated in Figure 4. Table 2 lists the 
maximum achievable data rates for OFDM modulation which are a direct result of the 
transmit spectral mask (Figure 5), both of which are as specified in 802.11p. 
 
Figure 4. WAVE channel configuration. 
Table 2. Data rate options in a DSRC 10 MHz OFDM channel ([20] and [13]). 
 
Purpose Service Service Service Control Service Service Service
Center Frequency (GHz) 5.86 5.87 5.88 5.89 5.90 5.91 5.92






BPSK 1/2 6 3
BPSK 3/4 6 4.5
QPSK 1/2 12 6
QPSK 3/4 12 9
16‐QAM 1/2 24 12
16‐QAM 3/4 24 18
64‐QAM 2/3 36 24




Figure 5. Transmit spectrum mask and application, source: [20]. 
Of particular note regarding the MAC sublayer is that 802.11p incorporates the 
carrier sense multiple access/collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) with 802.11’s enhanced 
distributed channel access (EDCA) mechanism. EDCA permits four different access 
categories (AC) with separate frame queues which constitutes quality of service (QoS) 
functionality [20]. Figure 6 illustrates how the interframe space (IFS) and contention 
window (CW) affect the CSMA/CA protocol. Recall that a random slot is chosen from 
within the CW when a station checks the medium to see if it is clear to transmit, thus the 
larger CWmin the greater the delay will be before a certain access class (AC) could even 
have the potential to send. The sliding minimum and maximum values of the CW support 




Figure 6. Frame spacing illustrated, source: [21]. 
 
Table 3. Default EDCA parameter set used in 802.11p [20]. 
   
Table 3 lists the values used in 802.11p for the minimum and maximum CWs and 
arbitration interframe space number (AIFSN) which is multiplied by the actual time slot 
(46 ms in DSRC assuming the normally used 4 ms guard interval which is the sum of the 
SyncTolerance and MaxChSwitchTime values [22]) and added to the time required to go 
from transmit to receive mode on a transceiver (known as the short interframe space, 
SIFS) [21]. This relationship is given in Equation 1.  
  (1) 
ACI AC Description CWmin CWmax AIFSN
01 AC_BK Background aCWmin aCWmax 9
00 AC_BE Best Effort aCWmin aCWmax 6
10 AC_VI Video (aCWmin+1)/2–1 aCWmin 3
11 AC_VO Voice (aCWmin+1)/4–1 (aCWmin+1)/2–1 2
ACI AC Description CWmin CWmax AIFSN
01 AC_BK Background aCWmin aCWmax 7
00 AC_BE Best Effort aCWmin aCWmax 3
10 AC_VI Video (aCWmin+1)/2–1 aCWmin 2








IEEE Draft Standard 1609.0 (Draft 5 as of September 2012)  [23] is being 
developed to describe the WAVE/DSRC architecture and services required for multi-
channel VANET operation while IEEE Standard 1609.4 specifies the multi-channel 
capability of DSRC [22]. The 1609.4 Standard provides a mechanism to synchronize the 
participants and divide communications between the CCH that all units monitor and one 
of the six SCH that the various units choose to monitor [22]. It specifies, as shown in 
Figure 7, a fixed 100 ms sync interval comprised of approximately 46 ms monitoring the 
CCH, a roughly 4 ms guard interval, approximately 46 ms monitoring a SCH, and 
another approximately 4 ms guard interval. This multi-channel, distinct application 
capability of DSRC is a unique and interesting aspect of this networking environment. 
Work has been undertaken to take advantage of it in order to balance the desired safety 
and commercial services, as in [24].  
 
Figure 7. IEEE 1609.4 sync interval. 
One of the innovations of the 2010 version of the 1609 standard is the permission 
for OBUs that have multiple physical layer devices, and only with those RSUs equipped 
to support, to agree on alternate channel monitoring schemes for secondary channels. 
Thus the primary physical device is required to monitor the CCH as before, but other 
physical devices on the same OBU are permitted to agree on the OBU staying on a CCH 
only, SCH only, switch between them, or simultaneously operate on the CCH and SCH 
with the multiple physical interfaces. Thus with multiple physical devices, secondary 
physical devices can be allowed to shift to a SCH in mid-interval, or skip a CCH all 
together and stay on the SCH. These are illustrated in Figure 8. 




Figure 8. Channel access options: alternating, cont, immediate, and extended [25]. 
2.1.2 Network and Transport Layers 
In addition to supporting the Internet Protocol version six (IPv6) network protocol 
using either Transport Control Protocol (TCP) or Universal Datagram Protocol (UDP) for 
datagram transport, DSRC also supports unique network and transport protocols designed 
for more immediate, single hop communication. These messages, known as WAVE Short 
Messages (WSM), are defined by the WAVE Short Message Protocol (WSMP) in IEEE 
Standard 1609.3 [25]. It is a simplified and extremely efficient means for exchanging 
information quickly between participants with very little overhead. 
Of particular note is the security mechanism envisioned for VANETs as specified 
in IEEE Trial-Use Standard 1609.2 [26]. This installment of the 1609 family of standards 
calls for the use of a public key infrastructure (PKI) to secure the V2V and V2I wireless 
transmissions. It is also presently an area of great interest among academic, industry, and 
government researchers. While the idea of car communications has existed for many 

















last five or so years as pointed out in [27]. With the onset of a networked world, the 
increasing need for security has only become more apparent. Furthermore, there exists a 
fundamental belief that if this technology is to be implemented, no less than equivalent 
privacy must be provided by the VANET. A summary of the documented security 
considerations are provided in Section 2.2. 
2.1.3 Application Layer 
Upon standardization of the lower five network layers, it is assumed that most of 
the work going forward in terms of VANETs will be at the application layer. Two general 
applications are actually part of the 1609 family: 1609.1 which is a basic messaging 
service/resource manager [28] (but has been slated for potential withdrawal) and 1609.11 
for electronic payments that could be used for tolls [29]. SAE J2735 specifies message 
sets, data frames, and elements to permit interoperability at the application layer. Some 
additional applications have been suggested by the IEEE DSRC working group and the 




Table 4. DSRC potential applications [30, 31]. 
 
Various applications will have different traffic requirements. Table 5 lists 
different categories of applications and their corresponding data traffic requirements. It 
remains to be seen to what extent DSRC will support non-safety applications based upon 





























Table 5. Typical DSRC data traffic requirements, source: [33]. 
 
2.1.4 VANET Distinguishing Factors 
The previous paragraphs describe the makeup of vehicular networks. It is 
important to recognize that there are a number of characteristics that distinguish them 
from other networks, including [34-37]: 
1. Vehicles (Nodes) have a Long Life Span (average 12 years [38]) 
2. Owners have Physical Access and Control over Nodes 
3. No Technical Expertise is Expected from the Vehicle Drivers 
4. Legal Aspects of Driving a Vehicle Complicate Situation (Liability vs. Privacy) 
5. Low Tolerance for Errors in Some Applications (downloading a song involves 
little risk; if an error occurs in a VANET there is the potential for great risk to life 
and property) 
6. Tension between Authentication and Privacy (need for some to know source; but 




















~100/~10 kbps ~100 Periodic 50‐300
Safety of 
Life
Work Zone Warning ~100/~1 kbps ~1000 Periodic 300 Safety
Transit Vehicle Signal 
Priority
~100 ~1000 Event 300‐1000 Safety
Toll Collection ~100 ~50 Event 15 Non‐Safety




> 20 Mbps n/a n/a 0‐90 Non‐Safety
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7. Many Safety Applications are Delay-Sensitive (if a vehicle in front slams on the 
brakes, one wants to know almost instantaneously so one can react) 
8. Predictable (generally must stay on roads), High Mobility (speeds of zero to 85 
MPH/135 KPH or greater) of the Vehicular Nodes 
9. Highly Dynamic Topology (from widely variable speed of nodes) 
10. Largely One-Dimensional Movement at Times (static road system; straight 
roadway legs) 
11. Large Scale (covering entire cities, states, and potentially continents; there are 
about one billion cars on the road in the world) 
12. Partitioned Networks (various entities certify various regions) 
13. Vehicles not Completely Reliable (need for secure communication; nodes can 
break down) 
14. No Significant Power Constraints (as in sensor networks) 
15. Varied Density of Nodes (higher density in cities; lower density in rural areas). 
16. Network Deployment (not all cars will possess VANET capability initially and 
there must be an incentive for vehicle manufacturers and buyers to desire its 
incorporation) 
These differences contribute to a unique networking environment with new 




2.2 Security and Privacy Consideration 
Among these new set of challenges is that of security. While certain aspects of 
security remain unchanged, the unique VN operating environment alters other facets and 
introduces new considerations. Different aspects of VANET Security will now be 
examined. 
2.2.1 Requirements [39, 40] 
The security requirements in VANETs are no different from most situations. 
There is a strong desire for message authentication and integrity, which is the ability to 
know a message came from a purported source and the contents have not been changed. 
In addition there is the desire for message non-repudiation, which implies that the sender 
cannot deny that he or she is the source of the message. Entity authentication extends the 
receiver’s knowledge to not only know who the originator of a message is, but also that 
the sender is presently active on the network/the message was sent fairly recently. Access 
control is the security property that assigns roles to various users and ensures that users 
are valid members of the network and operating in accordance with those roles, i.e. only 
performing authorized actions. Within a VANET it is also desired that some messages be 
able to achieve confidentiality, which means that only intended recipients of a messages 
contents are able to access it. Accountability is the security aspect that allows one to 
attribute events in the network to entities and users operating within the network. As with 
any network, availability is an important aspect for if the network is unavailable for use it 
might as well not exist. 
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Finally, privacy protection is a critical element of VANET security, which 
requires that protected personal information is not disclosed. Within VANETs this is 
related to limited or conditional anonymity such that other users are unable to 
authenticate the identity of the originator (but ultimately law enforcement should be able 
to when appropriate, such as a “hit and run” incident, which may or may not require a 
warrant depending on the policies implemented). Location privacy is a subset of this and 
entails preventing other users from tracking a vehicle. While privacy may not seem as 
critical to security as the other aspects aforementioned, it has consistently been identified 
among drivers, among the VANET projects, and in the academic-industry-government 
consortia as critical to VANET adoption [41, 42]. 
2.2.2 Vulnerabilities [43] 
As with any network, if it is to be useful it must be connected to other nodes and 
in doing so the network becomes vulnerable to undesired nodes connecting. VANETs are 
no different and have a series of vulnerabilities as identified by the European Securing 
Vehicular Communications (SeVeCom) project. As a wireless network, it can be 
jammed, which means sufficient interference is produced that prevents reception of the 
actual signals. Forgery, the purposeful injection of inaccurate data as accurate, presents 
another hazard that could undermine a VANET. Furthermore, if data is to be transmitted 
beyond a single hop, the network becomes vulnerable to in-transit traffic tampering 
whereby other nodes can drop, modify, or resend messages. In addition to 
misrepresenting the payload of packets, an adversary could also impersonate a different 
sender. As the nodes are built into (or contained inside) vehicles, there of course exists 
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the potential for tampering with the onboard unit itself. Finally, there exists the ability to 
learn not only who a user is, but also their actions and preferences resulting in a privacy 
violation. 
2.2.3 Adversaries [37] 
In order to understand the security dimensions of VANETs, there is value in 
considering the kind of people the most likely attackers might be. In general, there are 
five categories of adversaries a VANET may have to deal with. Greedy drivers may 
simply want an unfair amount of the bandwidth or to provide false information so they 
can direct traffic away from their intended path. Those who simply want more 
information than is due them are termed “snoops” by Parno and Perrig and could be 
simply engaging in voyeurism or scanning for opportune times to commit crimes. 
Pranksters are those with no direct benefit from their actions except potential notoriety 
from their success. Those from within the car industry seeking a competitive edge or 
financial profit through the abuse of their potentially more trusted position represent 
another adversary class and are termed industrial insiders. Finally there is the malicious 
attacker who consciously seeks to cause physical and logical damage. 
2.2.4 Attacks [37] 
These adversaries have an inherently large variety of attack vectors given the 
scope of VANETs and their wireless nature. Four general categories of attacks include 
denial of service (DoS), where the attacker simply seeks to shut down the network or 
node(s) from accessing the network. Message suppression attacks seek to undermine the 
connectivity of a network by dropping packets. Opposite of removing packets, fabrication 
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attacks inject additional (and usually false) information into the network. Finally beyond 
simply adding or removing packets, the alteration attack changes the content of legitimate 
packets being sent. 
2.2.5 Supportive Properties [37] 
Fortunately for VANETs there are some characteristics that aid in providing 
security. As the OBUs are contained in vehicles, there exists the opportunity to regularly 
inspect the vehicle (and consequently the OBU) during annual safety inspections that are 
mandatory in most jurisdictions. This allows for validation of the tamper-proof device 
(TPD) assumed to be installed [43, 44], software updates, aid in the download of new 
certificates, and renew the current certificate revocation list (CRL). These last two items 
will be discussed more thoroughly at the beginning of Chapter 3. A second advantage is 
that most vehicles can be expected to behave correctly (honest majority). While of course 
this cannot be said to be always the case and especially not for a single instance where a 
malicious attacker is present. However for the many driver infractions that occur each 
day, there are many more responsible drivers on the roadway that, much more often than 
not, abide by the law. Thirdly, there are additional inputs to VANETs such as radar, light 
sensors, and of course the driver. Thus there can be more intelligence applied to the use 
of the information provided by the VANET. Another benefit to VANETs is the central 
registration that exists for vehicles to be placed on the road. Such administration should 
aid in the deployment of VANETs. The fact many portions of the road have controlled 
access (such as ramps on and off the highway or bridges to and from a city) make it 
easier to predict where the majority of vehicles will travel. In addition to pre-existing 
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administrative support to define the VANET, there are also existing enforcement 
mechanisms, namely the police and other law enforcement entities that can allow for 
better arbitration within the VANET. 
2.3 Proposed Methods of Balancing Authentication and Privacy 
In VANETs, there is an inherent need for trust due to the interdependent nature of 
the nodes participating in the network. The safety of one vehicle and its reaction to 
emergent information received is dependent upon its ability to trust that information. If a 
vehicle reports a car in fog in front is slamming on its breaks, a vehicle has a split second 
to decide how it is going to respond to this information. Multiple means of organizing 
these trust methods, with various levels of authentication and privacy have been offered. 
In [45], these are divided into two categories: those that are infrastructure based and those 
that are self-organizing. Infrastructure based trust approaches involve establishing trust 
through some external, mutually trusted entity and include certificate-based systems as 
well as blind signatures, proxy signatures, and group signatures. Self-organizing based 
approaches require the autonomous evaluation by each node regarding whether to trust 
any other node and are known as reputation based systems. 
There is vigorous debate as to the better approach to securing vehicular networks. 
While many researchers have investigated self-organizing methods [46-51], the IEEE 
1609 standards body has maintained a preference for an infrastructure based system due 
to the legal and safety implications involved. Relying on external, unknown entities to 
“vote” on whether to trust another vehicle provides too great a safety vulnerability as it is 
exceedingly easy for a rogue group to conspire to bias the trust levels of any reputation-
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based system – or even a single person with multiple identities (which is a Sybil 
attack).While it is quite possible that the various self-organizing systems could have 
impactful use for various applications (such as restaurant and product reviews), it remains 
envisioned that an infrastructure based system is necessary to meet legal requirements 
and provide the highest level of system confidence. Reputation-based systems definitely 
have the potential to enhance security, but due to the limited contact any two nodes have 
with each other and the privacy implications involved, it is generally not considered a 
good basis for VANET security. 
In terms of infrastructure based systems, considerable energy has also been 
expended examining various methods to secure VANETs and provide for authentication 
and privacy. While there is much consensus that a PKI is the best solution to providing 
security (including privacy as soon discussed) to VANETs, alternatives have been 
proposed primarily out of motivation that a PKI is too complex to administer (including 
the difficulty in distributing PNs) [52]. Identity-based encryption was proposed in [53], 
but has not gained much following as the vehicle is given the opportunity to build as 
many identities as possible opening the network to Sybil attacks and vehicle identities 
must be pre-distributed.  Group signatures have been suggested, such as in [54, 55], but 
are computationally expensive given that the key must change (requiring RSU access) 
every time a new vehicle enters or leaves a group and the short duration of groups that is 
expected given the ephemeral nature of VANETs. Hu and Laberteaux present in [56] 
another approach where messages are sent encrypted but the keys are sent later, but this 
approach raises the question of what to do if the key is never received or if the delay in 
receiving the key is too great to take the appropriate action. OBU-generated certificates 
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that are then signed or blindly signed by a CA have also been proposed as in [57], but this 
doubles the amount of data to be transmitted and questions arise over OBU’s generating 
their own certificates. 
Golle, et al, propose doing away with any message signing and relying solely on 
sensors to provide VANET security [47]. They envision each vehicle creating an entire 
model of the VANET via its sensors and then using this model to determine if messages 
it receives are valid. This undermines the cooperative nature of VANETs and greatly 
limits its value to the limited range of a vehicle’s sensors. Another approach to message 
security is proposed in [58] in which all messages received are submitted to an RSU for 
validation. This depends on a large density of RSUs and again is inefficient in its 
requirement for additional bandwidth. Thus others have sought to abandon the PKI 
approach but shortcomings have kept the bulk of academic, industry, and government 
research and standardization efforts on implementing a PKI, recognizing the need to 
adapt it to the unique vehicular environment. 
2.3.1 Public Key Infrastructure 
PKIs are generally comprised of three entities: users, certificates, and the 
certificate authority (CA) [59]. In our case, the users are the on board units (OBUs) 
within the vehicles and the road side units (RSUs) that are deployed. The certificates are 
what bind an entity to an identity and their formats are specified in RFC 5280 and 
referred to as X.509 PKI Certificates [60]. The CA is who issues the certificates that 
implement a hierarchy of trust. The CA is often referred to as the “root” for if one has its 
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public key, one is able to establish trust down a chain of certificates to the entity in 
question. 
As laid out in section 2.2.1, VANETs have a number of security requirements. It 
is envisioned that PKI would be the “trust anchor” for VANETs [44]. In fact, the Trial-
Use IEEE Standard 1609.2 covers security within VANETs and codifies the use of a 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the securing of vehicular communications with 
corresponding definitions given under section 5.15 [26]. Sections 5.11 and 5.12 of IEEE 
1609.2 dictate the use X.509 certificates using the elliptic curve digital signature 
algorithm (ECDSA) as presented in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-




VEHICULAR PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
3  
The problem of protecting a user’s privacy while ensuring the ability to attribute 
abuse in VANETs remains open and important to solving the engineering challenge that 
is networked vehicles. As discussed in Section 2.3, while other approaches have been 
offered in the literature, the standards have consistently adopted for use a PKI and the 
research community has recognized the need for implementing pseudonymous 
certificates to protect the privacy of VANET users [62, 63]. However, the underlying 
assumption has been to utilize a long-term root certificate authority (CA) key to perform 
the signing. In our work, an alternative technique designed specifically for the use in 
networks of an ephemeral nature is proposed. Our proposed technique solves the 
problems of a reduced key space and “wasting” of certificates (as discussed in [64]) while 
providing insight into the logistics of a VANET PKI (VPKI) implemented within a 
regional framework. Work by others assumes a large VANET infrastructure (with the 
ability to contact the certificate issuer at any time) that does not exist (and will take 
considerable resources to build) [62, 65]. Our approach requires less additional 
infrastructure compared to these approaches. Without a doubt, a traditional PKI must be 
adjusted [66] to work in a vehicular environment based upon the network and legal 
differences highlighted in Section 2.1.4. For example, since an always on connection 
does not exist in a VPKI, two of the most important aspects of a traditional PKI are 
hindered: the distribution of new key pairs (pseudonyms in a VPKI) and the distribution 
of certificate revocation lists (CRL). A method that solves the latter challenge is provided 
29 
 
by Nowatkowski in [67]. The former challenge remains an open problem and is the focus 
of this completed research. 
In terms of IEEE 1609.2, certain parameters of VPKIs have been set including 
certificate details. The OBUs (which are assumed to have less processing power) are 
specified to use 224 bit keys while the CA and RSUs are specified to use 256 bit keys. 
Annex C of 1609.2 provides the structure of the certificates  and specifies 125 byte OBU 
(see Figure 9)  and 135 CA/RSU signing certificates (see Figure 10) [26]. A pseudonym 
consists of the certificate (which proves the validity of the sender) as well as the sender’s 
public key (which is used to validate the signature for integrity purposes). Thus an OBU 
pseudonym is 153 bytes (29 bytes for the public key and 125 bytes for the signature).  
 






















Figure 10. CA certificate (adapted from Table C.1 in [26]). 
3.1 Pseudonyms 
It is through asymmetric cryptography that all of the security requirements are 
met, with the sole exception of privacy. In order to achieve this requirement, Hubaux et 
al. introduced the idea of using multiple certificate pairs in VANETs in [68], which they 
termed “pseudonyms” (PNs) and proposed to measure anonymity via an entropy-based 
approach. A public key infrastructure where multiple keys are issued to vehicles for use 
in signing messages is known as a vehicular or VANET PKI (VPKI). In [69], the author 
of this proposal lays out the foundation for a VPKI that supports up to one second PN 
shifts,  includes regions, the periodic recycling of the PN key space,  and PN assignment 
strategies to improve VPKI administration. 
Pseudonyms are the key component to bringing privacy to VANETs and have 
been identified as the best approach to securing VANETs [70]. By changing the 




















based solely upon the keys used (which is not the case for a standard PKI where the 
private key, and subsequently the public key, do not change). PNs will be an important 
part of VANETs and only as implementation becomes a reality and IEEE 1609.2 matures 
will these parameters and their effects on network functionality (such as routing as 
discussed in [71] where changes of one minute had minimal impact while changes of five 
seconds or less undermined routing) and security be fully understood and established. 
3.2 VPKI Privacy Enhancement 
The literature lays out a variety of other methods to achieve and/or improve 
privacy. It remains to be answered how often pseudonyms will change, how many PNs a 
vehicle will possesses at any given time, and how often this pool of PNs will be 
refreshed. In [72], the changing of PNs is recommended to occur based upon speed and 
existence of neighboring cars, the idea being that the slower one is going or the fewer 
vehicles nearby, the less often changing one’s PN increases privacy. The idea of “mixed 
zones” is presented in [73, 74]. This extends the “neighbor” concept to fixed 
geographical places that when cars all enter a certain area (zone) then all the vehicles 
change PNs simultaneously so an outside observer who is watching a car enter the zone 
would no longer be able to determine who the car is when it leaves the zone. In [75] a 
protocol entitled “CARAVAN” is presented that groups nearby vehicles into a caravan 
such that random periods of silence are enforced on the vehicles and a subset of the 
vehicles in the caravan report their position and velocity information since they are all 
close together and have similar characteristics. Eichler in [76] extends the silent periods 
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to a more general “quiet time” rule that requires vehicles to enter a period of no 
transmissions prior to changing their PNs to prevent observers from linking PNs. 
3.3 Factors that Affect Pseudonym Use 
As discussed in Section 3.1, pseudonyms are a critical component to 
implementing a VPKI that meets all the security requirements (outlined in Section 2.2.1) 
including providing privacy. It is important to note that the actual details of PN usage 
remain to be established. There are a number of these details that are necessary to 
consider when designing a VPKI. One of these is storage. If PNs are going to be 
generated by the trusted infrastructure, in order for this trust to be preserved there must be 
secure storage that prevents tampering with the vehicle’s private key(s) and the PNs 
themselves (so that they are not misused in signing messages that do not originate from 
the vehicle). Thus a trusted computing platform (TCP) as discussed in [77] or its 
equivalent is a necessary development before the deployment of truly secure vehicular 
networks. In addition to have secure storage, there must also be enough. With the 
plunging cost of storage per gigabyte, this is not considered to be a problem [78]. 
Another factor regarding PN use is the duration for which a single PN is valid. A 
related and slightly different question is for how long a particular PN will be used and 
whether multiple PNs will be valid over the same period. The literature suggests the 
lifetime of a pseudonym to be from a second to a minute to a few minutes to a day or 
longer [36, 79]. Eichler in [76] claims that 100 seconds is the best choice. Whether or not 
these change times should be static or dynamic [76, 80] or be geographically bound [39, 
81] are also under consideration. There is also the question of how many certificates 
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should be on an OBU in terms of covering all 24 hours of the day or less time given cars 
are not on the road around the clock (which would also affect storage). 
Another important factor is how often an OBU is envisioned to go between 
downloading additional PNs as well as the maximum time an OBU is allowed to go 
without infrastructure contact and PN refill before it lacks any valid PNs. The more often 
it needs to contact the infrastructure, the less PNs it requires each time and storage space 
it requires, but the greater the burden on the infrastructure (in terms of deployment 
density) and less bandwidth available for other applications. The results from an analysis 
we did in [69] are shown in Figure 11 which illustrates the relationship between storage 
(y-axis), PN refill period (x-axis), and PN use duration (plot lines).  
 





When discussing any PKI, it is imperative to allow for the revocation of 
certificates which can occur for a variety of reasons. In a VPKI, a car could be sold, 
stolen, or suffer a system failure, each of which would result in the need to cancel the 
validity of the remaining certificates. The more certificates that are generated and 
distributed, the greater the demand placed on the revocation process. One solution to 
revoking VPKI certificates involves the use of certificate revocation lists (CRLs) [82]. 
Efforts to improve the efficiency of CRLs for VANET applications are presented in [83]. 
3.4 Use of Regions within a VPKI 
One of the fundamental building cells of any public key infrastructure is the 
certificate authority, the ultimate gatekeeper in whom all entities of the infrastructure 
place trust in. We envision in our work [69] that VANETs will be dissected into 
geographic subdivisions known as regions. These regions are of two different varieties: 
those which are subdivided within a given CA which are called “intra-regional entities” 
and those that cross CA boundaries which are called “inter-regional entities.”  
The authority that can establish and revoke keys below a root CA is known as a 
regional certificate authority or simply RA. Provided that there is a balance between the 
number of intra-regional entities, then it becomes possible for an OBU to possess all of 
the RA certificates or at least those that are closest and most likely to be encountered. If 
such an OBU enters an intra-region without that RA’s public key, then it will have to 
request it from an RSU it encounters (ideally) or another OBU (if necessary). Since the 
RA’s public key is signed by the root CA which is already known to the OBU, there is no 
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potential violation of trust outside those inherent to the use of a PKI (such as the root 
CA’s private key being compromised). 
3.5 Inter-Regional Operation 
In our work [69] we point out that the implementation of a vehicular public key 
infrastructure is slightly more complicated than the intra-regional scenario because the 
OBU would not normally possess the public key of the external CA. This scenario can be 
resolved in multiple ways, all of which ultimately result in the same technical result from 
the OBU’s perspective. One option for trusted international partners might be to simply 
“cross certify” the root CAs. In this case, each root CA signs the public key of the 
neighboring root thereby assimilating all the neighboring OBUs into its VPKI. Then 
when sending interregional messages, the OBU must also send the public key of its 
domestic root CA. The receiving OBU can then either add an additional step of 
confirming the sender’s root CA public key and then use that to verify the sender or if 
such a vehicle has already encountered a foreign vehicle from this same root CA and 
possesses that key, can immediately verify the trust of the sender and read its message. 
In the case where the root CAs are not ready to provide full trust to a neighboring 
region, a method of “guest registration” must be implemented. This could be performed 
in advance before arriving at the border by requesting a single or multiple PNs for use in 
the foreign region depending upon their policies or at the border crossing itself during the 
typical customs inspection. Thus travel within the United States or Europe could be 
considered intra-regional while crossing from Texas to Mexico or from a Schengen 
country to the Ukraine would be inter-regional and require these extra processes. 
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However once an OBU is granted guest PN(s) it would function in the foreign region just 
like any other OBU within that region. 
3.6 Overview of a Framework to Support Frequent Pseudonym Shifts [69] 
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) provide the means to add convenience, 
services, and safety to the road. We now introduce our work [69] as a means to adapt the 
concepts of Public Key Infrastructure for a VANET environment under the worst case 
scenario of a pseudonym shift every second. Regions are used to scale down the size of 
certificate revocation lists (CRLs), administrative overhead, and the search space to link a 
message to its originator when necessary. Regions also provide a means for expansion of 
the geographical area covered and provides the ability to balance geographic mobility 
with privacy. Whereas previous discussions have been in general, what follows is one 
particular example we have developed of how a VPKI could be implemented, outlining 
our method to extend PKI to VANETs. What follows provides the details for the 
infrastructure itself as well as the method of issuing pseudonyms to maximize privacy, 
ensure attestation, and develop an exceptionally large pool of private/public key pairs to 
draw from. This framework can then be modified to the decided pseudonym shift 
frequency and/or extended for other purposes. 
In a VANET, two distinct components comprise the communication 
infrastructure: onboard units (OBUs) and road side units (RSUs). OBUs reside on the 
vehicle and possess reasonable, albeit limited, computing (i.e. processing, memory, 
storage, etc.) power. Such units are mobile and thought to be very large in numbers and 
the primary communicators of the system. RSUs, on the other hand, are fixed structures, 
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networked together with access to the CAs, which can provide greater computing power 
and can be used to administer the network. 
In a PKI, a chain of trust is established between two users by a mutually trusted 
entity (ultimately the root CA). When Internet access is present, the trust chain can be 
traversed with little effort provided the public keys of all intermediaries between the root 
CA (which, it is assumed, is already trusted by both parties and that both parties are in 
possession of its public key) and the entity to be confirmed is available. If the public keys 
of the intermediaries are not already held by the verifier, they are normally available for 
download within the PKI certificate directory. 
The dynamic shifts considerably when Internet access is not assumed (as in 
VANETs) which results in being unable to acquire missing public keys on demand. It is 
for this reason that the originator of a message includes his or her public key when 
sending signed messages [26]. Thus the receiver will have the public key of the 
message’s originator and needs to have the key of the root CA and any intermediary 
authorities. How many CA/RA keys are needed and how these are acquired is what this 
section answers. 
To minimize the number of CA/RA keys needed, balance security of the root CA, 
minimize the processing required to verify keys and validate messages, and provide for a 
virtually unlimited number of keys, a relatively flat PKI hierarchy is proposed to be used, 




3.6.1 A Note on Sybil Attacks 
The current draft IEEE 1609.2 standard OBU and RSU certificates only have an 
expiration date and no start of validity of date. Thus if many certificates are provided 
under the current standard, an OBU would have a large number of valid certificates at the 
start which trailed off in time. As discussed in [84], we concur that the standard should be 
amended to have both a start and stop date for validity which reduces the number of valid 
certificates at a present time (down to one should it be desired) and thus reduces (and 
potentially eliminates) the possibility of a Sybil attack. This is the result of limiting the 
number of issued certificates that are valid at any given instant, which, at one extreme, 
can be one (thus eliminating Sybil attacks altogether). Should the number of issued and 
valid certificates be greater than one, it would be necessary to detect malicious behavior 
such that an OBU that participates in a Sybil attack would have all of its certificates 
revoked [47, 85, 86]. 
3.6.2 Vehicle Identification Number Certificates 
When a car is manufactured, a unique vehicle identification number (VIN) is 
assigned to the car by the manufacturer (and administered by a political authority such as 
the U.S. Department of Transportation). When a vehicle is first titled, an identity 
certificate is issued binding this VIN to the OBU, similar in function to the electronic 
chassis number discussed in [72].  The OBU is assumed to be a tamper-proof and secure 
computing platform. While this certificate is permanent (it resides with the vehicle, not 
the owner), it is only used for communications between the OBU and the CA. This 
portion of the scheme reflects a traditional PKI. The root VIN CA certificate should have 
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crypto periods of 30 years and the root VIN Extended CA certificate should be valid for 
10 years in keeping with current best practices [87]. This means that about every ten 
years the VIN-binded certificate will have to be renewed. Again, such logistics fall under 
the domain of a traditional PKI. 
 
Root VIN CA
Root VIN Extended CA 
VIN-binded Certificate  
Figure 12.  Certification path for vehicles identification number-binded certificate. 
3.6.3 Root and Regions 
For a given nation (ex. United States) or political entity (ex. European Union), a 
single root CA (complementary but distinct from the root VIN CA) is established. 
Subordinate to the root is a series of regional CA’s (an example of regions for the United 
States is provided in Figure 13). The root CA signs the certificates issued to the regional 
CAs who in turn use these certificates to sign all pseudonyms issued in a given region 
(see Figure 14 from our work in [69]). The root CA is only used to sign the regional CA’s 




Figure 13.  Example of potential regions in the United States. 
It is worth noting that the Root Class 2 CA also signs a Regional CA to be used 
by the root for issuing certifications that are valid throughout all the regions but at a 
decreased level of privacy. Privacy is reduced because a limited number of cars will be 
using these “universal” certificates and thus they will be easier to track. This CA is used 
to issue pseudonyms to international vehicles, commercial vehicles that routinely drive 
across multiple regions, and vehicles titled outside any regional authority (ex. military or 
federal). 
 
Root Class 2 CA
Regional CA
OBU Pseudonyms 




3.6.4 Vehicle Registration 
Each region then serves as a subordinate (Regional) CA to whom each political 
subdivision, which we will refer to as territories, serves as registration authorities (RAs). 
When a vehicle is titled in a territory, that territory’s motor vehicle department verifies 
the car’s identity (using the VIN certificate) and then requests a block of pseudonyms 
from the regional CA. The block consists of certificates to be used over, for example, 12 
months (the exact number of pseudonyms is dependent upon the rate they are elected to 
change; we are assuming a worst case scenario of one per second and certificates for 
every second of the day).  
To further improve security, the blocks of certificates are limited in their validity 
to some subset of this time, such as one week or one month (or even one second). This 
reduces the likelihood of flooding the roadways with valid certificates and ultimately 
results in a reduction in the size of the certificate revocation list. In addition to the 
pseudonyms, the complete set of valid public keys for the root CA and all regional CAs 
must be downloaded to the OBU. As will be seen shortly, this will require 3n public 
certificates, where n is the sum of the number of regions under the root plus two (one for 
the Root Class 2 CA and one for the Regional Root CA).  
Vehicles then perform this registration annually (much like paper registration) at 
either a government office or a contracted registration office. Such offices would have 
VPN connectivity to the RA and simply serve as the secure conduit. Renewals of 
pseudonyms would ideally occur seamlessly. In Pseudonyms on Demand [65], it was 
proposed that a user could refill pseudonyms continuously at local RSUs. However this 
assumes a tremendous (and costly) infrastructure is in place. 
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3.6.5 Certificate Term of Validity 
Here lies the novelty of our scheme. Unlike traditional PKI, a PKI within a 
VANET construct must be formed differently. No longer can the root certificate have a 
lengthy term of validity for this will result in large search scopes. Likewise, one must 
also eliminate an extensive certification path to ensure each OBU has the corresponding 
CA public keys.  
We propose that the root CA stores the necessary information to link certificates 
with the issuer so as to be able to identify a user and provide traceability. Thus, the same 
key pair can be re-used provided a different CA issued it. Furthermore, the root CA and 
regional CA keys must be generated in advance and sufficient time provided to ensure 
they are distributed to every OBU. 
The root and regional CA public/private key pairs exist through three phases. At 
the beginning of the first phase, the keys are generated and then during the remainder of 
this phase the public key is distributed. During phase two, the public key is distributed 
and now the private key is used to generate the pseudonyms which will become valid at 
the start of phase three. In the final phase, the public key is still distributed and now the 
pseudonyms become valid for use. For a given key pair, these three phases represent one 
key cycle. The keys cycle based upon the following constraints and an example is 















Phase I  Yes  No  No 
Phase II  Yes  Yes  No 
Phase III  Yes  No  Yes 
 








Phase I  No  No  No 
Phase II  Yes  Yes  No 
Phase III  No  No  Yes 
 
The third phase lasts for the overall duration of the validity of the key block 
issued. The time for which renewals are permitted prior to the key block expiring is the 
duration of the second phase. The first phase lasts the length of the third phase minus the 
length of the second phase (Equation 2). 
The number of overlapping key pair cycles (OKPC) is given in Equation 3. This 
also represents the number of public keys an OBU must store for a single RA key pair. 
 






From the OBU’s perspective, on its initialization in the system, it would receive 
all the public keys from the series in Phase I, II, and III. Its pseudonyms would be 
generated from the single regional CA in phase II. For renewals, it would only need to 
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receive its pseudonyms (from the regional CA in phase II) and the public keys from the 
CAs in phase III for use in subsequent cycles.  
For example, pseudonyms could be issued in 12-month blocks with the earliest 
renewal six months prior to expiration. This would mean the “future” public keys would 
have to be advertised six months in advance. Thus phase I would be six months, phase II 
six months, and phase III twelve months long. The root certificate would be generated 
and in use for 24 months, valid for 18 months, and only used to issue pseudonyms for six 
months. The first six months would serve as the distribution phase (I), the next six 
months as its active use for issuing new pseudonyms (II), and the final 12 months of its 
validity would be its sunset phase (III). In the sunset phase the OBU certificates 
previously issued are valid but the number of valid certificates stored on all OBUs 
gradually reaches zero. Thus every six months, the set of available pseudonyms returns to 
its untapped, maximum size. 
 
Figure 15. Root and regional CA cert. lifespan example (showing cycles). 
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3.6.6  Pseudonym Shift Frequency 
The pseudonym shift frequency remains one of the most critical design criteria yet 
to be determined. In [55], a one minute interval is used and in [63] pseudonyms are 
changed every 10 minutes. Others, such as in [53], use a user-defined interval.  The rate 
of pseudonym shift directly impacts the number of pseudonyms provided at a time (see 
Figure 11 on page 33). The other factor is the period between refills – longer periods 
require more pseudonyms per refill. At present, we are assuming a static refill based on a 
one year period. Future developments hope to follow others [65] in relying upon actual 
consumption to determine the number of pseudonyms provided but without the reliance 
on expensive (and as of yet non-existent) infrastructure. 
3.6.7 Region Development 
It is envisioned that VANETs will deploy in a progressive fashion. This scalable 
scheme is very flexible to grow and shrink provided regions do not get too big and 
overload the CA or too small so as to make distributing the regional CA certificates too 
inefficient. To add a new region, a new regional CA would be established and its public 
key would be distributed along with all the other regional public keys six months prior to 
it signing new keys (during phase I). The rest of the process would continue as before. 
Note that after 18 months of its first distribution, “n” of Section 3.6.4. increases by one 
for each additional region. 
To remove a region, one simply does not distribute any more public keys for it 
and then use the region keys associated with the region(s) that cover the previous region. 
In our example, this results in “n” reducing by one after 18 months. 
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3.6.8 Inter-Regional Pseudonyms 
Within the area covered by the root CA, vehicles are able to travel between 
regions (e.g. when taking a trip). Likewise, people who live on the border of two regions 
are likely to spend time within both regions.  
It is a privacy concern for a vehicle registered in region 1 to be travelling in 
region 2 as the set of vehicles with pseudonyms signed by an outside region is 
significantly smaller than that of those signed by the present region. To resolve this, we 
propose assigning pseudonyms on a fractional basis from neighboring regions such that at 
least a third comes from a neighboring region but no less than half come from the 
primary region. For example, vehicles registered in region 1 would receive 2/3 of the 
pseudonyms from region 1 and 1/3 from region 2; vehicles registered in region five 
would receive 50% of the certificates from region five, and 1/6 from regions three, four, 
and six. This allows for a mixture of regionally assigned pseudonyms to be used in a 
given region (so even vehicles registered in region one will sign using region 2 
certificates) and the use of more than one region by a vehicle (so when a car from region 
one is in region two, it can use predominantly region 2 certificates). 
Should a vehicle travel beyond neighboring regions, it will have to perform a 
“visitor registration” which can be done over the DSRC channel. Such registration would 
involve communicating via RSUs using the VIN ID certificate and acquiring a small (e.g. 
one week’s worth) number of pseudonyms for use while in that region. This is similar to 
the inter-root CA process outlined below, however is greatly simplified due to the 
common root CA. 
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Recall from section 3.6.3 that a mechanism also exists for vehicles that routinely 
cross regions to have its certificates issued by the root CA at a decrease in privacy. 
3.6.9 CRL Considerations 
Two CRL choices include the traditional list and a Bloom filter. Under the 
traditional CRL, each region maintains its own CRL which it periodically transmits as 
described below. A window of time is used to determine who to include in the CRL (for 
instance, if a vehicle is revoked with six months of certificates left with a shift frequency 
of one second, only the next week or two would be added to each CRL distributed). 
Certificates that have expired are simply removed from the CRL by both the OBUs and 
the CAs.  
An alternative was introduced by Haas, et al. to use a Bloom filter to reduce the 
size of the CRL and expedite an OBU verifying a given certificate has not been revoked 
[63]. We extend this idea to encompass the use of regions. Each region will have its own 
CRL. Furthermore, the CRL’s are self-pruning due to the certificate expiration dates and 
revoked certificates that are not yet valid would not be included in the CRL. The 
processing required to build the Bloom filter bit vector is handled by the RAs.  
The distribution of a CRL is covered in [84]. In a given region, the CRL bit vector 
would be transmitted on the first service channel (SCH) as needed, but at an interval no 
greater than 12 hours. The CRLs of the other regions would be transmitted on other 
service channels based on geography (ex. the region to the north on SCH 2, to the east on 
SCH 3, etc). The root CRL (to handle international vehicles) would be transmitted on 
SCH 6. Recall from Section 3.6.7 that vehicles operating in a given region are required to 
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use pseudonyms produced by that or an adjacent region, thus there is no need for a 
vehicle to have a CRL from a non-adjacent region. 
There is a trade-off between the size of the CA region and size of the CRL, as 
well as the management complexity of the entire PKI system for VANETs.  The least 
complicated region to manage would be a single large area, such as the entire United 
States, with a single CA responsible for every certificate and pseudonym.  This would 
also result in the largest CRL since every revocation would appear on the CRL.  This 
relationship can be summarized as:  (a) the CRL size is proportional to region size and (b) 
the management complexity is inversely proportional to region size. 
Bellur in [88] gives some analysis on region size and provides some techniques 
for managing transitions from one region to another.  Thus, a vehicle would have a set of 
pseudonyms for their "home" region plus additional sets of pseudonyms for regions 
adjacent to their "home" region.   
3.6.10 Archive Implications 
To maintain traceability of a given message with included public key, the regional 
CA must maintain a database of the issued public keys by a given regional CA (and 
potentially the expiry date) to each VIN. The size of this is determined by the change rate 
of the pseudonym. There is no need to keep the private key provided one can rely on the 
principles of asymmetric cryptography (i.e. one accepts that the odds of another private 
key producing an output that can also be unlocked by the provided public key 
approaching zero for sufficient key length). 
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The size of the data to be archived can be reduced through the use of hashes. By 
hashing the key, one reduces the amount of information to store, but one also reduces the 
ability to uniquely match a public key. However this may be more politically viable as it 
increases privacy while providing statistically significant matches. Furthermore, a 
decision must be made as to how long to keep these records in terms of a statute of 
limitations, such as twenty years (the longest timed length for federal crimes in the 
United States [89]). 
3.6.11 Inter-Root CA Travel 
Another area of limited development is the movement of vehicles between areas 
covered by different root CAs (which was introduces in Section 3.4). Along those borders 
of countries with strong diplomatic ties, mutual trust, and equivalent standards, cross 
certification can be employed as previously discussed. 
On borders where this is not the case, a temporary vehicle registration process 
could be set up so that upon entering, a vehicle is registered with the root (a temporary 
VIN certificate can also be issued if not present or not compatible), the root and regional 
CA public keys can be provided to the vehicle, and a block of pseudonyms can be issued 
sufficient for the length of stay, all consistent with the general principles previously set 
forth. 
3.7 Overview of Preliminary Pseudonym Distribution Protocol [90] 
Using our work from [69] as an established framework to provide some sense of a 
canvas to work with, we now turn to examining our work on how PNs might be 
transmitted from an RSU to an OBU. Having VANETs support this methodology of PN 
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delivery is critical for mass adoption of VANETs given the magnitude of the scale of 
motor vehicles. In this section we present a method of pseudonym distribution that works 
across regions. This methodology can also be used for the efficient refill of pseudonyms 
within a region thus simplifying the acquisition of pseudonyms to a single, standardized 
protocol regardless of the scenario.  
Other works have investigated the need for privacy through PNs and their 
efficient use. Some of these papers have focused on completely anonymous transmissions 
[91, 92] at the expense of authentication and thus security. Some papers have focused on 
strengthening the privacy within a VANET by altering the pseudonym switch behavior 
(as in [93]) or the antenna characteristics (as in [94]). In [62], the authors introduced a 
method of using anonymous certificates to acquire pseudonyms (PNs) in other regions. 
While these certificates could be verified to be valid, the assumption is that the other 
region would find issuing certificates to an anonymous, albeit verifiably valid, user 
acceptable. Most nations insist on authenticating a traveler crossing the border (ex. via 
passports) and thus this scheme does not seem acceptable to traveling across regions of 
different jurisdictions. There is little discussion in the literature of the details of actually 
exchanging PNs within a VANET between an OBU and an RSU. This section attempts to 
fill this void and may even be used with the various PN approaches found in the literature 
(including the ones previously discussed). 
The primary contributions of Section 3.7 are: (1) a unified protocol that can be 
used for the transmission of PNs whether for refill (their reloading as the supply expires), 
usage within a new region under the same CA (intra-regional), or usage within a new 
region under a different CA (inter-regional); (2) the incorporation of control channel and 
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service channel intervals and the multiple service channels which are uniquely available 
to networks under the draft IEEE 1609 standard; (3) the extension of such a protocol 
across multiple RSUs to provide a more scalable solution to the distribution of PNs 
problem; and (4) the inclusion of a control mechanism to prevent endless flooding of PNs 
in these subsequent RSU transmissions. 
3.7.1 A Word on Privacy 
Various authors have noted that privacy is not absolute in VANETs (such as 
Chaurasia, et al, with the “global adversary” discussed in [94]). And while we believe 
privacy ought to be maximized so long as security is preserved, we also believe that to 
demand greater privacy than what is currently afforded by vehicles without VANET 
capability is unreasonable. At present and without VANETs, cars can be tracked by 
interested parties and linked to their owners (via license plates). Thus the focus of 
VANETs cannot be the achievement of absolute privacy, but rather an equivalent privacy 
to what drivers in the world enjoy today. It is for this reason pseudonyms were introduced 
to provide defense against long-term tracking and eliminate the ability of an unauthorized 
user identifying the behavior of a vehicle by simply reviewing network logs. 
3.7.2 Pseudonym Refill 
Given that within a VANET security relies on the use of asymmetric 
cryptography and privacy depends on the relatively frequent shift in public keys, there 
exists a need for new keys on an ongoing basis. Refilling PN strategies are varied and 
extend from (a) the technologically simple but user’s time intensive approach of plugging 
in a vehicle to (b) the need for almost ubiquitous RSUs to provide pseudonyms at any 
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given instant on a frequently recurring basis [65]. In the protocol presented in this 
section, a balance is struck to reduce the overall number of times a vehicle must refill its 
pseudonyms while keeping the refill almost invisible to the vehicle’s driver. 
3.7.3 Regions 
Upon their deployment, it is assumed that VANETs will be broken up into 
autonomous regions [72]. Some of these regions will fall within a single CA, the crossing 
of which can be described as intra-regional. Others, however will be under different CAs 
and thus will require inter-regional certificate exchanges. The protocol we present works 
in both situations. 
3.7.4 Pseudonym Generation 
One of the important questions in the use of pseudonyms is their generation. It is 
possible for them to be generated by the vehicle, sent to a CA to be signed, and then sent 
back for vehicle use. Or they could be generated by the RSUs, signed by the CA, and 
then sent to the vehicles for use. Thirdly, they could be generated by a third party, signed 
by the CA, and then sent to the vehicle for use. Finally, the CA itself could generate them 
and send them to the RSU for distribution. 
The first case places the burden of processing on the OBUs but reduces what 
needs to be transmitted to only the public keys. This has a potential security weakness in 
that the CA does not have a copy of the private key (which does enhance privacy) and 
thus is unable to confirm a valid key pair exists (it simply is signing whatever the OBU 
sends to it). The second case shifts the processing to an RSU, which is presumably more 
computationally capable than an OBU, and relieves the CA of having to do all the 
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processing. This provides greater security in that the key pairs are being generated by the 
infrastructure vice the vehicle, but runs into issues if the vehicle does not stay near the 
RSU long enough to receive the keys being generated. Using a third party also removes 
the processing from the OBU and RSU but introduces an additional host into the 
transaction. Using a server at the CA to generate the key pairs provides the greatest 
security in assuring that the keys are valid and provides for central management of the 
key distribution. For this reason, our protocol assumes this fourth case, but could be 
adapted for any of the others. 
A final important note regarding PN generation is the time required to perform 
this task. Most likely, sufficient PNs will be downloaded to vehicles to cover a certain 
temporal period (such as three, six, nine, or 12 months). Thus the time it takes to generate 
a larger set of pseudonyms is not insignificant. Ideally, the refill could be anticipated and 
the keys pre-generated to save this time. Regardless, the keys will still need to be 
transmitted from the generator to the distributor and finally to the user. 
3.7.5 Single RSU Pseudonym Distribution 
As mentioned in 3.7.2, one of the methods of PN distribution is on an individual 
basis as an OBU contacts an RSU. Concerns with this method include the need for a large 
density of RSUs and the frequent use of the VANET bandwidth. Previous work discussed 
the possession of PNs to support a longer term of usage (such a one year as in [43]). Thus 
one of the important questions is: how much data can a vehicle acquire during a single 
pass of an RSU? This is a hard question to answer as it is based upon many factors 
including the speed of the vehicle (and changes in speed), the distance the vehicle is from 
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the RSU (and changes in direction), the density of other vehicles (in terms of beacons on 
the control channel), the VANET bandwidth utilization (in terms of throughput on the 
service channels), the number of channels being used, the OBU and RSU radio range, 
and so on.  
Using ns-3 [95], we simulated a single vehicle passing a single RSU at various 
speeds and distances to provide some insight into the “ideal” throughput achievable. We 
used IEEE 802.11p to model the physical layer and IEEE 1609.4 to model the MAC layer 
(more details of the simulation configuration are provided in Section 4.4). Our simple 
protocol relied on the vehicle sending out a request message upon receipt of an RSU 
beacon and the RSU continuing to send PNs provided it received OBU beacons. This 
simulation did not take into account processing time or transmission time from the PN 
generator to the RSU. The simulation setup is shown in Figure 16 and the results are 









































Under these “ideal” conditions and travelling at typical driving speeds, a 
maximum of 7.1 Megabytes were able to be received (at a speed of 11.2 meters/second 
(25 MPH) and 15 meters offset as defined in Figure 16). Using PN sizes from [96], this 
corresponds to approximately 48,686 PNs or about one year’s worth using one PN per 
minute and having only two hours’ worth of PNs per day (as was the case proposed in 
[72]). However, if one uses more PNs per day, shift them more frequently, drive (on 
average) more quickly, have other vehicles competing for the service channel, or pass 
further from the RSU, one will not be able to get a year’s worth of PNs in a single pass. 
Our protocol is introduced to facilitate the distribution of PNs within a region, 
intra-regionally, and inter-regionally. 
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3.7.6 Pseudonym Distribution Protocol (PNDP) 
The ephemeral nature of VANETs provides for limited time windows for 
communication between vehicles and infrastructure. Thus, in order to transmit a file of 
greater size over a VANET, one could increase this window (by slowing the vehicle 
down or even making it stop). Another approach, and the one we take, is to concatenate 
multiple windows together in an effort to make the process invisible to the driver. The 
basic protocol works as follows. 
When a vehicle determines more (of the same region) or new (of a different 
region) pseudonyms are needed, it begins to monitor the control channel (CCH) 
transmissions for an RSU beacon advertising PN services. Upon receiving such a beacon, 
it transmits in the next service channel (SCH) a request for pseudonyms. As this is the 
first request, the RSU will initiate pseudonym generation (using one of the methods in 
3.7.4 above). As soon as PNs are available for distribution, and provided a beacon was 
received by that OBU in the previous CCH, the RSU will transmit the PNs to the OBU. 
The RSU will continue to do this as long as corresponding beacons are received in the 
CCH. Once a certain number of consecutive control channels pass with no such beacons 























Now begins the forwarding portion of the protocol to minimize the delay for 
obtaining the remaining PNs during further OBU-RSU contacts. The RSU forwards to 
the most likely RSU(s) (as discussed below) the remaining PNs beginning with the first 
PN during the last SCH where PNs were transmitted (thus the last block sent will be 
available for re-transmission as the OBU left the RSU’s range sometime after its last 
OBU beacon was received/the previous PN block was acknowledged and when its next 
beacon should have been received). 
One of the potential circumstances is that an RSU could receive a block of PNs 
but never encounter the OBU. To address this problem and provide a graceful conclusion 
to the protocol from such an RSU’s perspective, we introduce two fields in the PN 
forward message. The first one indicates the number of times the current block of 
pseudonyms has been forwarded (PN Block Forward Count or PNBFC) and the second is 
the maximum times the block can be forwarded without an RSU contacting the OBU 
(Mf). Thus the RSU who has had no contact with the OBU could either drop the PNs 
(which would occur when Mf = 1, that is the block was forwarded to it, so PNBFC 
already is one) or forward them on to the next adjacent RSU(s) (which would occur when 
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Mf > 1). Another feature of this field is to forbid additional RSUs from forwarding PNs at 
all by setting Mf to zero. (These variables are best implemented through a single “count 
down” variable which is initially set to Mf, when this variable reaches zero, no more 
forwarding is performed. A list of variables used in PNDP is provided in Table 8). 
Meanwhile, the OBU continues to determine if it still needs PNs and if not, the 
protocol ends. If it does, it again monitors its CCH for RSU beacons. Upon receiving one, 
it sends a PN request message during the next SCH indicating the next PN it expects to 
receive. Upon receiving this message, the RSU should already have the PNs and be able 
to begin transmitting. 
 
Figure 18. PNDP state diagram (OBU). 
 
Figure 19. PNDP state diagram (RSU). 
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The previously described steps continue until all the PNs have been distributed. 
Figure 18 and Figure 19 illustrate the state diagrams for the OBU and RSU respectively. 
Mr represents the maximum consecutive CCH intervals for the OBU to experience with 
no RSU beacon being received before determining the RSU is out of range. Mo fulfills 
the same purpose for the RSU with regards to the OBU. RNBC is the “RSU No Beacon 
Count” which is incremented each time a CCH interval passes with no beacon received 
from the RSU of interest and reset to 0 each time such a beacon is received by the OBU. 
ONBC performs the same function for the RSU. 
The protocol diagram for PNDP is provided in Figure 20 and provides more detail 
regarding the content of the messages being exchanged. The vehicle makes the initial 
request for additional PNs using its long term key and its current PN (1). This 
authenticates both the vehicle and the validity of the current PN which are then verified 
to be linked by the CA. The RSU responds with a symmetric key encrypted with the 
vehicles public key and signed by the CA as well as the service channel to use for the 
duration of the transmissions (2). This service channel can be changed during any 
subsequent control channels. The vehicle in (3) then makes a PN block request by 
sending its PN and the key encrypted using the CA’s public key. This exchange is 
repeated for all future requests so that the RSU can validate the user and ensure it is using 
the correct symmetric key. The RSU responds by sending as many PNs as possible 
during each service channel where it receives an OBU beacon in the previous control 
channel (or at least one in the previous Mo control channels) (4). When the no-beacon 
counts (RNBC and ONBC) time out, the OBU and RSU determine themselves to be out 
of range (7) and the RSU forwards the remaining block of PNs to the next most likely 
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RSU(s). In (8), the OBU has received a beacon from the next RSU and again makes a PN 
request. In this request it sends its current PN as well as two pieces of information 
encrypted by the symmetric key: its previously used PN to link the transaction and the 
next expected PN block. 
3.7.7 Pseudonym Blocks 
The actual transmission of PNs would be performed in “blocks” (of 8 for 
example) based upon the MTU and the size of the certificates. IEEE 1609.2 specifies 
each PN to be 153 bytes [26] while the addition of a “valid from” field (which we 
advocate) would increase this size to 157 bytes [96]. Each of these blocks would be 
numbered to facilitate the next RSU transmitting at the next needed block with minimal 
retransmissions. The total number of blocks is transmitted in step two of the protocol so 
the OBU knows when the total intended transmission is complete. Should the OBU leave 
the RF range of all RSUs prior to receiving the total number of blocks, it will know more 
are needed upon its return (or could notify the driver). 
3.7.8 Modified Diffie-Helman 
In order to protect the secrecy of the PNs and provide greater efficiency (quicker 
decryption), their transmission would be encrypted using a symmetric algorithm, such as 
AES. During the initial request for PNs, the OBU would send its signed long-term key 
(as discussed in [69]) along with its current public key (represented by CA-(V+), i.e. the 
CA signed public key of the OBU) which would allow the CA to link this vehicle to all 
its pseudonyms it will use during the transmission. The RSU will respond with the 
symmetric key which it has signed and, using the vehicle’s public key, encrypted. The 
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OBU will then request PNs by sending its current pseudonym and the next expected 
block number encrypted using the now shared key. The RSU responds with the OBU’s 
current PN signed (so that other vehicles can quickly discard the packet) and as many 
blocks of PNs (signed using the symmetric key) it can transmit in the service channel. 
This layer of abstraction is illustrated in Figure 20 with the abbreviations used listed in 
Table 9. 


























Figure 20. Protocol Diagram 
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3.7.9 Next Most Likely RSU 
The next most likely RSU can be determined a number of ways. In the worst case 
scenario it is inaccurately determined and the RSU the OBU contacts will have no prior 
knowledge of its need for PNs. The RSU will have to contact the CA thus replicating the 
overhead of the initial RSU. It is our goal to avoid this situation; however if it does occur 
we are no worse off than not having a multiple RSU protocol to transmit PNs. 
A slightly better approach would be to send the remaining blocks of PNs to the 
next RSU the vehicle would encounter based upon its current trajectory. Then if the OBU 
encounters this RSU next, the PNs are preloaded and transmission can begin almost 
immediately. However the vehicle is apt to make turns in which case it may never 
encounter this RSU. 
A different approach is to flood all adjacent RSUs with the information as the 
vehicle will most likely come in contact with one of these next. This is a reasonable 
solution given that the out-of-VANET-band network (i.e. the infrastructure-to-
infrastructure or I2I network) is used and maximizes the likelihood that the OBU will 
contact an RSU that has been pre-loaded with its PNs. It is worth noting that this still 
does not guarantee the vehicle will cross paths with an RSU that has been preloaded as 
the vehicle could pass between two RSUs in a dead zone that neither has coverage (or it 
could stop short between the past RSUs and any other ones). 
Finally, with the growing use of navigational systems in cars, it is believed that 
in-dash as well as external units could be utilized to provide routing information to the 
OBU. Using this information, the OBU could optionally provide its path to the CA which 
would then pre-load the PNs on the RSUs along that path. 
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3.7.10 Multi-Channel Usage 
One of the unique features of VANETs is the six service channels provided for in 
the draft standards IEEE 1609.4 [97]. Our protocol takes advantage of this to either 
transmit PNs to more than one vehicle or leave other channels open for other 
applications. 
3.7.11 Inter-Regional Certificate Authorities 
In [69] we discussed a methodology for regions and PN usage. This protocol 
builds upon this (or could be adapted to other approaches) by providing a protocol to 
transmit the PNs to the OBUs. In cases where vehicles are transiting beyond regions 
covered by a single root CA, the OBU will also need additional public keys of the various 
regions covered by the new CA. Thus at inter-regional crossings, the RSU must be 
prepared to also transmit, prior to the PNs, these public keys. Such RSUs would expect 
this and have the keys readily available. 
Probably less obvious is the need for RSUs at borders to verify the validity of the 
presently valid PNs that have been issued by a different CA. Of course the RSUs will 
have ready access to such keys given they will have a networked connection to the 
Internet (unlike OBUs), however policies must be in place to accept such PNs and permit 
the issuance of locally generated PNs by the inter-regional entity to the “foreign” OBU. 
3.7.12 Scalability of PNDP 
As the density of VANET enabled vehicles increases, the need for a protocol that 
can span multiple RSUs becomes even more important. OBUs will have a hard time 
monopolizing the bandwidth of a single RSU while within range of each other. 
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Scalability is one of the greatest features of this protocol as it allows for larger numbers 
of OBUs to participate among the available RSUs by taking advantage of the multiple 
channels provided. 
3.7.13 PNDP Conclusion 
The use of pseudonyms is a critical component to preserving privacy while 
permitting authentication in VANETs. Much work has been accomplished in fine tuning 
the details of this arrangement. This work has demonstrated through simulated results 
that a single pass of an RSU is insufficient to provide the bandwidth necessary for an 
OBU to acquire sufficient PNs for longer terms of usage. We have presented a unified 
protocol for the dissemination of such PNs for refill as well as the crossing of both intra-
regional and inter-regional borders that provides scalability while taking advantage of the 









Few tools, if any, have ignited the technological revolution that we experience 
today more than simulation. Simulation has been defined as the “process of building and 
analyzing the output of computer programs that describe the operations of an 
organization, process, or physical system” [98]. Engineers and scientists have used 
simulation to design, improve, or increase understanding of many facets of society. 
Electrical engineers use simulation in such diverse endeavors as controls, circuits, power, 
electromagnetics, and telecommunications to name a few. Simulation allows for rapid 
prototyping, reduced expenses, and valuable knowledge and experience. Thus simulation 
is a natural choice to assess various qualities of pseudonym distribution. While 
simulation is this powerful tool, we are also reminded that it is the “imitation of the 
operation of a real-world process or system over time” and as such has limitations [99]. It 
is important to document the environment in which a simulation takes place so that it is 
repeatable and its results can be clearly understood from within these parameters. This 
section seeks to do just that. 
4.2 Network Simulator 3 (ns-3) 
The Network Simulator was first conceived in 1989 as the REAL network 
simulator [100]. From 1995-1996 a discrete-event network simulator, called ns-1, was 
developed at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, a national Department of energy 
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lab using C++ with Tcl script based simulations [101]. From 1996 to 1997, its successor 
ns-2 was developed (originally by Steve McCanne) in C++ with an object-oriented 
scripting language used to run simulations and ultimately improved by the legitimacy and 
funding of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and later the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) [102]. Meanwhile at the Georgia Institute of 
Technology a more powerful network simulation tool known as GTNetS (for GA Tech 
Network Simulator) was developed completely in C++ and able to handle a previously 
unattainable complexity of over a million network elements [103]. In 2006, development 
of ns-2’s replacement, ns-3, was begun as an evolution of GTNetS and partially through a 
grant from the NSF with large contributions from the French National Institute for 
Research in Computer Science and Control’s Matthew Lacage. Its two co-principal 
investigators are Tom Henderson (Boeing/UW) and George Riley (of our own Georgia 
Institute of Technology) [103]. It is presently in its 15th stable release (ns-3.15) and is 
freely available under the GNU license [104]. 
4.3 Assumptions 
The assumptions that we made were consistent with previous research conducted 
by the Network Security Architecture lab at the Georgia Institute of Technology [105]. 
The behavior of the nodes was predicated on their function. RSU’s were assumed to be 
stationary and placed as depicted in each simulation topography that will be provided and 
was designed to provide meaningful results. OBU’s were either directly involved in PN 
distribution consistent with the goals of the experiment (for example, when examining 
the effect of various OBUs of various PN fills requesting PNs, when a threshold was set 
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those OBUs involved in PN refill respected these thresholds). In some scenarios we 
examined the impact of PN distribution on background data transmission. In these, the 
background OBUs did not participate in the PN refill process and were assumed to have 
sufficient PNs to participate in the VANET.  
Given that IEEE 1609.3 requires that all VANET nodes be compatible with OBUs 
that possess only a single transmitter/receiver, we focused on this scenario and did not 
examine multi-channel PN distribution for a given OBU. We believe this is justified due 
to the economy of scale involved and, while we recognize that RSUs have multiple 
channels, the unlikely fact that an RSU would reserve multiple of them for PN 
distribution in the face of other competing services. When background data was part of a 
scenario, it was transmitted on a separate channel from PN distribution but was given 
background priority over the RSU processing PN requests. 
4.4 Simulation Configuration Parameters 
This research involved various channel model and mobility models that are 
described in the following two sections and identified with each scenario in Section 5. 
Settings that were the same across all simulation scenarios are provided in Table 10. 
Other settings, such as simulation time, vehicle velocity, and transmission range are 
situation dependent and also individually provided in Section 5. 
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Table 10.  Simulation configuration parameters. 
 
4.5 Simulation Channel Loss Models [106] 
Given its tremendous impact on the validity of the results, extensive research was 
conducted into the channel loss models supported by ns-3 in order to provide the most 
realistic propagation scenario for these simulations. A large variety of propagation loss 
models are available for use. The network simulator 3 release 10 (ns-3.10) natively 
supports eleven different such models, listed in Table 11, and discussed in the subsequent 




























or statistical, and ns-3 provides at least one of each. Furthermore, ns-3 also provides the 
ability to cascade models, including the addition of the probabilistic Nakagami fast 
fading model.  
Table 11. Native propagation loss models of ns-3.10 
 
Table 12 lists the variables used in our work. In general, simulators use a defined 
minimum receive power as the threshold to determine if a packet can be successfully 
received. The simulated receive power (enumerated in Equation 4) is compared to this 
minimum required receive power and either the packet is received or “lost.” For 802.11p 
simulated in ns-3, the default transmit power (TxPowerStart and TxPowerEnd) is 16.0206 
dB and the EnergyDetectionThreshold is -96 dB, which represents the minimum receive 
power for the receiver. Thus a loss of 112.0206 dB renders a packet “lost” in ns-3 [107].  
  (4) 
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Table 12. Model loss variables used 
 
4.5.1 Non-Applicable Models to VANETs [108] 
When modeling the VANET environment, some of the offered models within ns-
3 simply do not apply. The FixedRssLossModel for example yields a constant received 
power regardless of the distance between sender and receiver. The 
MatrixPropagationLossModel is equally unusable for VANET modeling as it fixes the 
propagation loss for each pair of nodes regardless of their actual positions. Finally, the 
RandomPropagationLossModel is also a poor choice as it simply selects a value each time a 
packet is received following a user defined random distribution. Finally, the 
RangePropagationLossModel uses the transmit power as the received power for distances 
between sender and receiver less than or equal to the specified “range” and a received 




4.5.2 Non-Applicable Empirical Model [108] 
From April 1989 until April 1996, the European Union sponsored the COperation 
européenne dans le domaine  de la recherche Scientifique et Technique (COST) forum 
that produced the COST 231 propagation loss model for use in dense locations (both 
indoors in the midst of a many-walled office or outdoors in dense urban environments) 
[109]. As an empirical model, it uses previously collected data as its basis and thus is 
very fast but generally less accurate for a given scenario. Furthermore, this model was 
only designed for use in 1.5 to 2 GHz frequency range and as such is not a good choice to 
model VANET propagation loss. 
4.5.3 Basic Models [108] 
Four basic propagation loss models, all deterministic in nature, are provided for in 
ns-3.10: Log Distance, Three Log Distance, Friis, and Two-Ray Ground.  
The LogDistancePropagationLossModel and the 
ThreeLogDistancePropagationLossModel incorporate the same calculation for propagation 
loss except that the three log model provides for four distance fields. Equation 5 is known 
as the log distance equation while Equation 6 provides the complete three log distance 
equation. The log distance model provides for basic attenuation and is normally 
associated with indoor environments, such as for use with wireless LANs. It is worth 
noting that it is the default propagation model of the YANS physical layer helper class in 
ns-3.10. The three log-distance model provides for additional tuning but is generally seen 
as an indoor or urban propagation loss model. 
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 (6) 
The FriisPropagationLossModel, is a simplified version of the log distance 
propagation loss model. Rather than using loss coefficients that must be empirically 
acquired and validated, it simplifies the propagation loss calculation to that given in 
Equation 7. It is not accurate for very small distances (the default minimum distance in 
ns-3.10 is .5 meters). 
   (7) 
The TwoRayGroundPropagationLossModel considers both the direct path and a 
ground reflection path when calculating the received power in accordance with Equation 
8. This model is often viewed as an accurate selection when modeling rural environments 
[110]. Thus for research in strictly rural environments, this simple propagation loss model 
may be of use. 
  (8) 
 
4.5.4 Accounting for Fading in ns-3 [108] 
It is possible in ns-3 to account for fading when using the propagation loss models 
discussed in Section 4.5 by applying either the Jakes or Nakagami models (to be 
implemented normally in addition to a propagation loss model). 
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The JakesPropagationLossModel implements a modified Jakes model (concisely 
presented in [111]) which seeks to incorporate Rayleigh fading and simplify its 
calculation. It uses a set of electromagnetic rays that would depart the transmitter in order 
to determine which ones would reach the receiver. These sinusoidal rays are then 
summed to determine the received power level. Jakes propagation loss is defined by 
Equations 96 and 10 [111]. It is worth noting that the initial phase shifts (ϕ) can be 
randomly generated according to a specified distribution, which however by default is a 
constant in ns-3.10. This fading model is most appropriate where multi-path is a 
significant issue and no line of sight exists between the sender and receiver, which is 
often the case in urban (or indoor) environments. 
 X t jX t  (9a) 
 
√
∑ cos	 ψ ∙ cos	 ω t cos α ϕ  (9b) 
 
√
∑ sin	 ψ ∙ cos	 ω t cos α ϕ  (9c) 
 , 1, 2, … ,  (10) 
The NakagamiPropagationLossModel applies the Nakagami fast fading distribution 
to the received power level and serves to transform otherwise deterministic propagation 
loss models to probabilistic ones. The Nakagami probability density function is defined 
in Equation 11 and, similar to the three log-distance model, is defined over three distance 
fields (0 to d1 is m0, d1 to d2 is m1, and d2 to d3 is m2). When m equals one, the Nakagami 
distribution equals the Rayleigh distribution.  
 ; ,  (11a) 
   2 ∙ , , 	 (11b) 
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4.5.5 Propagation Loss Model Summary 
The preceding paragraphs demonstrate that ns-3 provides those who desire to 
simulate vehicular networks three propagation loss models geared for urban 
environments, one for rural environments, and the ability to make these more realistic by 
adding Nakagami-m or Jakes fading. 
4.6 Identifying Simulation Values for a Realistic Communications Range 
The exact range of VANET communications is difficult to determine. Such 
factors as terrain, vegetation, and buildings, as well as RF interference from other 
transmitters in the 5.9 GHz spectrum have direct impact. Furthermore, policy and 
standards serve to limit the effective range to maximize the number of supportable users. 
The literature reflects a maximum range of 300 m for VANETs [112-114] which is 
consistent with experimental measurements of dedicated short range communications 
(DSRC) performed to date [115-117]. In these studies, it is noted that communications in 
urban environments normally involve a range of approximately 140 meters while those in 
non-urban environments achieve a range of approximately 300 m. It is for this reason that 
we set out to produce two sets of propagation loss parameters to support simulation in 




4.6.1 Ns-3.10 Default Propagation Loss Values 
Table 13. Default simulation parameters for Section 4.6. 
 
Using the default values of ns-3.10 (based on MAC and PHY layer parameters 
specified in Table 13, which except for propagation loss reflect those of Table 10) yields 
a maximum range of 151.5 meters over ten simulation runs (which provides a 95% 
confidence interval (CI) of being within ± 2% of the maximum range). These results are 
shown in Figure 21. As can be seen, this is a simplistic view of propagation loss with an 
almost infinite slope at the maximum range. In addition, this range exceeds (albeit it by 
only 11.5 m) the measured 140 meter maximum of urban environments and does not 
reflect the 300 m measured range for non-urban environments [115-117]. Given these 
differences from the expected communications range in VANETs, this motivated us to 
perform some simulation based research to find appropriate loss parameters that 














Figure 21. Default value range in ns-3.10 
4.6.2 Proposed VANET Propagation Loss Parameters 
This section outlines the proposed parameters for researchers to use when 
simulating VANETs in ns-3. All values were derived by us following the methods 
outlined in [99] in order to obtain a 95% CI with a half-width of 2% of the mean 
simulated value. 
The proposed ns-3 propagation loss model parameters are summarized in Table 
14 for both urban and rural simulation environments. Recall that the Two Ray Ground 
model has been identified as the most realistic propagation loss model for use in 
simulating rural environments with fewer obstructions while the log distance, three log 
distance, and Friis are more appropriate for urban environments. 
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Table 14. Summary of proposed propagation loss model parameters. 
 
Adding fading is considered an important means to make a simulation of 
propagation more realistic. The Jakes fading model is parameter-less, while the proposed 
parameter values for the Nakagami-m model are listed in Table 15 for both urban and 
rural environments. 
U/R Prop Loss Model Parameter Value Units
Both Two Ray Ground Lambda 0.05093 meters
Urban Two Ray Ground MinDistance 140 meters
Rural Two Ray Ground MinDistance 300 meters
Urban Log Distance ReferenceLos 37.35 dB
Rural Log Distance ReferenceLos 47.2 dB
Urban Three Log Distance Distance0 1 meters *
Urban Three Log Distance Exponent0 2.5 unitless
Urban Three Log Distance Distance1 75 meters
Urban Three Log Distance Exponent1 5 unitless
Urban Three Log Distance Distance2 114 meters
Urban Three Log Distance Exponent2 10 unitless
Rural Three Log Distance Distance0 1 meters *
Rural Three Log Distance Exponent0 1.9 unitless *
Rural Three Log Distance Distance1 210 meters
Rural Three Log Distance Exponent1 15 unitless
Rural Three Log Distance Distance2 286 meters
Rural Three Log Distance Exponent2 3.65 unitless
Both Friis Lambda 0.05093 meters
Urban Friis SystemLoss 26.7 unitless




Table 15. Summary of proposed fading model parameters. 
 
4.6.3 NS-3.10 Simulation Setup and Results 
Two metrics were used to measure the effectiveness of the parameters proposed in 
Section 4.6.2. Each second a hundred packets were sent from a stationary RSU to a 
moving OBU traveling away from the RSU at a speed of one meter per second. The first 
metric was the greatest distance at which all 100 packets were received and was entitled 
the “effective range” (and labeled “Max 100% Dist” in the figures). The second metric 
was the maximum distance at which any packet was received and was primarily used to 
ensure consistency of the results (labeled in “Max Distance” in the figures). The aim of 
this work was to identify which propagation loss parameters would result in an effective 
range of 140 m (for urban) and 300 m (for rural) while running the necessary simulations 
to demonstrate the 95% CI of being within 2% of the mean.  
Our results demonstrate an acquired effective range in an urban environment of 
140.3, 139.9, 140.1, and 139.9 meters for the log distance, three log distance, Friis, and 
two ray ground models respectively and 299.5, 299.9, 299.5, and 299.9 meters 
U/R Fading Model Parameter Value Units
Both Jakes None *
Urban Nakagami‐m m0 1.5 unitless *
Urban Nakagami‐m Distance1 60 meters
Urban Nakagami‐m m1 0.75 unitless *
Urban Nakagami‐m Distance2 145 meters
Urban Nakagami‐m m2 0 unitless
Rural Nakagami‐m m0 1.5 unitless *
Rural Nakagami‐m Distance1 80 meters *
Rural Nakagami‐m m1 0.75 unitless *
Rural Nakagami‐m Distance2 320 meters




respectively in a rural environment. These results are shown in Figure 22 and Figure 23, 
with the error bars indicating the 95% CI of the mean effective distance. 
Furthermore, the maximum distance achieved reflects the nature of the probability 
loss models. As an example, the maximum distance of the log distance propagation loss 
model is a few meters greater than the three log distance model that uses progressively 
greater loss coefficients. Given that the two ground ray model uses a deterministic cut-off 
of received signal power, it stands to reason that the range of 100% reception and the 
maximum range be almost identical. 
 





Figure 23. Propagation loss simulation results (rural) 
Fading was added to a selection of propagation loss models to demonstrate their 
impact. These results are shown in Figure 24. To illustrate the difference between 
simulating packet transmissions without and with fading, a scenarios of log distance 
propagation loss without and then with Nakagami-m fading was simulated, the results of 
which are illustrated in Figure 25 and Figure 26. 
 




Figure 25. Packet reception plot using default values with log distance propagation loss 
 
Figure 26. Packet reception plot with log distance propagation loss and Nakagami-m 
fading in an urban environment 
83 
 
4.6.4 Ns-3 Propagation and Fading Loss Conclusion 
The use of simulators to provide insight into the workings of complex systems is 
an invaluable tool of the modern researcher. The ability to fine-tune a simulation 
configuration is a powerful asset to establishing causal relationships between design and 
performance. However the need to compare work across various efforts is an important 
necessity for true peer review. In this section, we have reviewed the nine propagation loss 
and the two fading models provided by ns-3.10 and evaluated their applicability to 
simulating vehicular networks. We proposed propagation loss and fading model 
parameter values to adapt ns-3 for VANET use. These proposed values were then 
validated through a series of ns-3 simulations within two percent of the mean values with 
a 95% confidence interval. It is our hope that these standardized values can provide a 
good reference for VANET researchers utilizing ns-3 (as well as potentially other 
simulators) as we all work towards a future of safer, more efficient, and more 
environmentally friendly vehicular travel. 
For the remainder of this research, we adopted ThreeLogDistance propagation 
loss values of Table 14 and the Nakagami-m fading loss values of Table 15 consistent 
with whether we were simulating an urban or rural environment. 
4.7 Mobility Models Overview 
There are ten natively supported mobility models within ns-3.10 as summarized in 
Table 16. Each of the constant mobility models allows a node to travel from its starting 
position and travel with constant velocity or acceleration unless manually adjusted by 
code. For the ConstantPositionMobilityModel, the velocity is unable to be modified 
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and is zero in all directions. For the ConstantVelocityMobilityModel, the velocity is 
set along the x, y, and z axes and does not change during the simulation unless manually 
done so. Similarly, the ConstantAccelerationMobilityModel involves providing each 
node with an initial velocity and then values for acceleration in all directions, which do 
not change unless explicitly later set to a new value. 
In addition to these constant approaches, ns-3 also supports three way-point based 
models that use “trace” files of timed coordinates. The models in turn generate the 
appropriate velocity for each node from these files between each waypoint. The 
WaypointMobilityModel involves the nodes traversing the individually defined 
waypoints sequentially. The RandomWaypointMobilityModel works by viewing the 
waypoints as a pool and randomly picking a new destination among the waypoints 
available after a random pause once it reaches the current waypoint. The 
SteadyStateRandomWaypointMobilityModel develops this idea one step further for the 
special case when velocity, pause between advancing to the next waypoint, and the 
waypoints themselves are each uniformly distributed random variables. 
Two random two dimensional mobility models are included with ns-3 and allow 
for more randomness in simulations while providing for controlled window of focus. The 
RandomWalk2dMobilityModel (also known as the Brownian Motion Model) allows the 
programmer to set each velocity (speed and direction) at random from user-provided 
random variables at either fixed distances or fixed amount of simulation time. In addition, 
if a node encounters one of the limits of the mobility window, the rebound of the node is 
in the opposite direction and speed. The RandomDirection2dMobilityModel is similar 
in allowing for each node to select from a random distribution of directions and speeds 
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after a specified pause. However in this mobility model the nodes continue at that 
velocity until they encounter the edge of the mobility window at which time each one 
waits the same delay and then randomly selects a new velocity and repeats this behavior. 
The final two mobility models represent particular cases for simulation. The 
GaussMarkovMobilityModel is a three dimensional model designed for aviation use and 
has both memory and randomness. In it, the programmer fixes a “TimeStep” and after 
each TimeStep the model uses the node’s current position and velocity (including pitch 
and yaw) to randomly select the next one based upon these values and the mean value, 
and a Gaussian random variable. The final native mobility model, the 
HierarchalMobilityModel, is for pack situations where “child” nodes follows a 
“parent” node, much like Pied Piper and the children of Hamelin. If the “parent” node 
moves north one meter, then all “children” nodes will move the same relative amount 
(one meter north) regardless of where they are located. 
Table 16.  Native mobility models of ns-3.10 
 
4.7.1 Mobility Models Analysis for Use in this Research 
Given the ten mobility models of the preceding Section, we find that for fixed 
entities (i.e. RSUs), the ConstantPositionMobilityModel is the best choice. For 
highway scenarios of straight road, we used the RandomDirection2dMobilityModel as 
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it allowed us to vary the speed for different traffic situations (no congestion, moderate 
congestion, and heavy congestion) but provide some randomness to the model. Since we 
were focused on particular geographic regions and wanted results for relatively fixed 
congestion across the entire simulation, the fact the vehicles reflected back into the road 
was beneficial and we considered this a one-for-one replacement (i.e. for every car that 
would have left the examined topography, another car entered). This preserved the traffic 
densities across the simulation. By using this same mobility model in an urban 
environment and only changing the direction to a limited number of choices all at right 
angles to the current direction of the OBU, we were able to replicate a downtown grid. 
Finally, for a more macroscopic and realistic simulation mobility model (but with no 
control of the congestion or roadway topography), we used the WaypointMobilityModel 
with ns-2 traces freely available from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology – 
Zurcich [118] that were demonstrated in [119] and adapted for use in ns-3 by Dr. Michael 
Nowatkowski in [105]. 
4.8 Verification and Validation 
Verification and validation is an important part of any simulation and involves 
ensuring that the simulation is realistic. By selecting appropriate propagation and fading 
loss as well as mobility models, we sought to incorporate realistic scenarios that would 
yield meaningful results. By using a widely available, free and open simulator that is 
presently relevant (it is currently under active development), all of our simulations can be 
replicated and the results we achieved validated. Furthermore, by using as much built-in 
functionality at the physical, media and access control, and network layers, we are able to 
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rely on the stability of well researched and documented code versus our own, un-
validated implementation. Finally, the code used in this research is an extensive extension 
of seed code previously used in the network and security architecture lab at Georgia Tech 
and has been vetted by other researchers and professionals in the VANET community, 
such as in [67]. 
4.9 Statistical Analysis [105] 
Realistic simulation models are critical to achieving meaningful results. But in 
order to possess meaning, a good simulation must produce statistically meaningful 
results. Fortunately ns-3 has a built in pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) that 
allows for output that is correlated across various configurations of a particular 
simulation scenario and permits the use of simplified statistical analysis tools on the 
correlated output. This is accomplished by using a different substream within the random 
number generator (known as the “RngRun” value in ns-3). This was accomplished 
through scripts that ultimately varied this value using the SeedManager::SetRun(int 
RngRun) method. 
Given this setup, statistical analysis was then accomplished to ensure the results 
were statistically significant using the methods described in [120-123] for correlated 
sampling. The same random number seed was used throughout all simulation runs, and 
the run number was incremented to use the next sub-stream of random numbers, as 
required by [124].  This synchronizes the random numbers to reduce variance between 
the scenarios tested and provided a more stable set of data across all scenarios. Of 
particular note is that the mobility models rely on these random number substreams when 
selecting their behavior and by using the same substreams, OBUs with the same mobility 
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model installed would follow exactly the same paths. This is important because the 
paired-t comparison requires correlated sampling and independent replications.  
 Each experiment was run for multiple iterations to find several samples (Y) for the 
experimental criteria, as determined by the scenario itself and normally in the order of 
thirty runs. The next step was comparing each of the runs with each other. Since 
correlated sampling is used, the difference between results for each method is found and 
then averaged, resulting in the average difference between the methods,  (as in Equation 
12), and the variance of the difference,  (Equation 13). For these two equations, R is 
the total number of replications and r designates an individual simulation run.  
 ∑  (12) 
 	 	∑  (13) 
 The null hypothesis, H0, is that the two means of the different simulations are the 
same; thus the difference of the means would be zero, as shown in Equation 14. The 
alternative hypothesis, Ha, where the means are different, indicates that difference 
between the methods is statistically significant at the specified confidence interval, (1  
α), as shown in Equation 15. A confidence interval of 95% was used throughout this 
study.  
 H0:  = 0 (14) 
 Ha:  ≠ 0 (15) 
 The number of samples and the sample variance of the experiment runs under 
investigation are used to find the half-width of the difference between their means using 
Equation 16. The value of 0.05 is used for α, resulting in a 95% confidence interval for 
the half-width. The number of simulation runs for each experiment (R) is used to 
determine the degrees of freedom for the student-t distribution. [105] 
 	 ,			 ∙ 	  (16) 
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 The half width is then used with the difference of the sample means to determine 
if the experiments have a significant statistical difference. If 	  contains 
zero, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, indicating that there is not sufficient 
evidence that the experiments produced different means, i.e., that they are not different.  
 This mathematically rigorous methodology, which was similarly used by previous 
members of the network architecture and security lab of Georgia Tech, was applied to all 
of the simulation scenarios examined to ensure the data was statistically meaningful and 
conclusions drawn from the data had merit. 
4.10 Simulation Computer Setup 
As previously mentioned, the network simulator used was ns-3, which is software 
that involved the researcher coding various simulator applications and the simulation 
configuration in C++ and then compiling this code in conjunction with the ns-3 program 
on Linux-based operating system. The simulation experiments were designed on a 
Fedora-flavored Linux partition. Early and simpler experiments could be run with 
statistically significant results as defined in Section 4.9, on a series of computers 
overnight. As the experiments became more complex, additional computing power was 
required as it would take over a week using five computers to calculate a single data set. 
Fortunately, we had access to Georgia Tech’s Partnership for an Advanced Computing 
Environment (PACE, [125]) high performance computing cluster which allowed 100’s of 
cores to be harnessed simultaneously using portable batch system (PBS) scripts to 
interact with the PACE jobs scheduler. Massive simulation runs were then able to be 
conducted in as little as four hours depending upon PACE’s available resources and 
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system availability (it did experience some extended periods of down time during our 
research).  
Data from the simulations consisted of a position log that could be used to follow 
the path of the OBUs and a second file which contained traces of all the packets sent and 
received by all nodes in the network. This latter file was then parsed using a MATLAB 





INVESTIGATED VANET IMPLICATIONS TO PN DISTRIBUTION 
5  
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed throughout this dissertation, it remains the dual goal of vehicular 
networks to provide both security and privacy [68]. In fact, the goal of protecting a 
driver’s location privacy is at the forefront of the minds of researchers, industry 
executives, and drivers given the proliferation of inexpensive technological tracking 
devices that can easily be used to monitor the movement of vehicles [126]. To protect 
against this threat within VANETs, pseudonyms remain the leading candidate as codified 
in the IEEE trial use standard 1609.2 [26]. Their distribution, however, is not a trivial 
issue given the vast number of mobile vehicles (or more precisely on-board units, OBUs) 
that comprise the network along with the fixed Road Side Units (RSUs). Of particular 
concern is their distribution in congested environments where contention for bandwidth 
will be great. In order to adequately address the PN distribution problem, one must 
examine when an OBU would be in a situation to need PNs.  
5.2 Measuring an OBU’s need for PNs 
5.2.1 File Distribution 
The concept of distributing files within a vehicular network remains an open 
research area that employs a wide range of potential solutions, from formal routing 
techniques to peer-to-peer file sharing. Much work has been done, such as Luo’s urban 
routing protocol [127], the hybrid traffic routing and data collection scheme of [128], a 
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peer-to-peer routing using Peer Computing based Ad Hoc On Demand Vector (PAV) as 
discussed in [129], and infrastructure-free file distribution with CoFFee [130]. An overall 
performance comparison of VANET routing protocols can be found in [131]. While we 
do not claim there is a “problem” with any of these approaches, we do share in the belief 
that the amount of bandwidth available within VANETs is quite limited [132]. 
5.2.2 Contribution 
The contribution of this section is in introducing the intelligent reduction of 
channel load due to unnecessary PN refill thus leaving more bandwidth for other 
applications or for those OBUs with greater need. Here our goal is entirely different than 
simply data dissemination. Rather than adding to the research of how to route data, we 
examine the issue of when a vehicle should request data, specifically in the context of 
pseudonym refill. To the best of our knowledge, no other research has examined this 
question. 
The work in this section demonstrates, through the use of ns-3 simulation, some 
methods that result in OBUs requesting PNs more intelligently, increasing the likelihood 
that vehicles with the greatest need will acquire pseudonyms. We do not simply examine 
existing PN distribution schemes, but rather introduce into the PN distribution process the 
novel question of “when should an OBU request PNs?” and demonstrate the impact of 
how these methods affect the answer to this question. 
5.2.3 Background 
The United Nations reported that by 2010, for the first time in their records, a 
majority of the world’s population will live in an urban setting [133]. The Brookings 
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Institute declared that “rising traffic congestion is an inescapable condition in large and 
growing metropolitan areas across the world” [134]. Thus for vehicular networks to help 
reduce congestion, they must function in highly congested environments. This work 
looks at PN distribution along congested arterial roadways. 
To determine what constitutes a reasonable measure of congestion, we analyzed 
traffic data from automatic traffic recorders (ATRs) as published by the State of Georgia 
(USA). From their study, we found that 29,419 vehicles passed through a given 
intersection in downtown Atlanta per 24 hour weekday [135]. We discounted night-time 
driving and sought to focus on the most congested portions of the day by reducing this to 
over only 12 hours, which yielded 2451.6 vehicles per hour or 20.43 over 30 seconds. We 
then modeled a single RSU slightly off-center in four square blocks of length 75 meters 
each, resulting in nine intersections (see Figure 27) containing an average of 184 
vehicles. For this reason we ran simulations with 175, 200, and 225 vehicles. Of these, 
100 were considered to be under observation for pseudonym refill and the remaining 
vehicles were engaged in background data transfer over the same shared channel.  
Our work seeks to understand the relationship of PN distribution with the 
potential for other data, whether administrative or not, also being disseminated. We 
examined the successfulness of vehicles getting PNs as well as the effects of the PN refill 
process on the ability of other vehicles to receive non-PN data (labeled “background”) 





Figure 27. Simulation mobility topography. 
5.2.4 Simulation Model Assumptions 
For the purposes of this research, a series of assumptions were made in an effort 
to demonstrate the effect of various pseudonym distribution policies. When an OBU 
seeks PNs, it is going to need to request them from the certificate or registration authority 
[69, 90] and some time will have to elapse between this request and when the RSU can 
begin transmitting the PNs. We are assuming a best case scenario such that the PNs are 
already calculated and at the RSU for immediate distribution. In the next section, we 
examine techniques for disseminating PNs to the RSUs. 
As for the vehicles themselves, in order to focus on congestion, each OBU’s 
mobility is independent but constrained to make 90 degree turns (randomly selected) and 
stay within the 150 m x 150 m area of concern. It is assumed that for each vehicle that 
would have left this area, another one would take its place. Since we are ultimately 
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concerned with the overall performance, aggregating the results provides the best 
indication of how various techniques would affect the overall system. We further assume 
that each OBU securely stores a cache of PNs on a trusted computing platform. We 
assume the use of each PN for one minute (validity period, as in [136]) and the 
possession of PNs for every hour of the day. Furthermore, we assume each OBU can 
store up to a year’s worth of PNs (60 minutes/hour x 24 hours/day x 365 days/year = 
525,600 PNs/year). The amount each OBU starts with at the beginning of the simulation 
is evenly distributed and fixed across each run such that the vehicles have a wide range of 
PNs in their possession. The goal is for the vehicles with the fewest PNs to acquire the 
greatest number during the length of the simulation.  
5.2.5 Simulation Communications Range 
As discussed in Section 4.6, the exact range of VANET communications is 
difficult to determine. Physical and electrical factors such as terrain, vegetation, 
buildings, as well as policy and standards limit the effective range to maximize the 
number of supportable users. Consistent with our rationale in Section 4.6 and given that 
the work in this section focuses on urban congestion, we incorporated ns-3’s Three-Log 
propagation loss model with Nakagami-m fading to limit communication to 140 m [106]. 
5.2.6 Traffic Shape 
In the simulations, we used a Poisson transmission rate of 100 packets per second 
of 1000 bytes each for the background traffic, which was sent to each OBU not involved 
in PN refill. PNs were distributed such that for each service channel interval in range 
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when a request has been received, the RSU sends the requesting OBU 10 packets of 1000 
bytes of data each (about 65 PNs total). 
5.2.7 PN Distribution Techniques 
In addition to possibly using wired PN transmission with regular periodic PN 
refill as in [39], some researchers have suggested that vehicles simply request PNs 
whenever they are in contact with an RSU [62, 65]. Concern lies with how many PNs a 
vehicle can obtain as well as the overall impact on bandwidth on neighboring vehicles. 
This issue is what the research outlined in this section seeks to gain insight upon. In so 
doing, three techniques are introduced and their performance impact measured through 
simulation with the decision by the OBU of when to request PNs being summarized in 
Table 17. 
The first technique we implemented is a “baseline” (shown as BL in the figures) 
such that all vehicles constantly seek PNs (if they are one of the 100 PN-designated 
OBUs) or data from the RSU (if they are one of the remaining OBUs). Thus whenever a 
vehicle in this scenario encounters an RSU, it requests PNs and the RSU responds to that 
request. OBUs in this method request PNs even if they have a large supply of PNs stored.  
These requests both add to the channel contention and reduce the number of PNs other 
OBUs are able to receive since an RSU can only transmit a limited number of PNs per 
service channel interval. 
The second technique we investigated used binary logic in determining whether 
an OBU should request PNs. An OBU requested additional PNs if and only if it stored 
less than a specified threshold of PNs onboard. We examined the threshold cases of 10, 
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20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90 percent “full.” Thus if the threshold was set at 40% and 
an OBU only had 39% of its capacity of PNs, it would request PNs until it reached 40% 
full. On the other hand, using the same 40% threshold, a vehicle that was 70% full would 
not request PNs until its load went below the 40% threshold. 
The final technique we investigated uses a probabilistic component to the refill 
question such that the likelihood an OBU sought additional PNs was inversely 
proportional to the number of PNs it possessed. In our method, the fewer PNs an OBU 
possessed, the more likely it would request PNs. The probabilistic component is further 
enhanced by utilizing a static threshold combined with a random number to control when 
a PN request is made. For example, if an OBU had 22% of its PN capacity and the static 
threshold was set at 25%, the OBU would uniformly select a random integer between 
zero and 25 and if that number was greater than its present capacity the OBU would 
request PNs during that service channel interval. On the other hand, if the threshold was 
25% and it had 40% of its PN capacity, the random number chosen would never exceed 
25 and it would never request PNs (until its cache was reduced to below 25%). We 
examined threshold cases of 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent. 
Table 17. PN request pseudocode. 
Method  OBU Request PN Pseudocode
1  Always request PNs 
2 
IF % full < threshold 
THEN request PNs 
3 
RND = RandomNumber[0, Threshold] 
IF (% full < threshold) AND (RND > % full) 




5.2.8 Model Metrics 
In order to shed some light on the issue of PN distribution in congested 
environments and the performance of the various proposed techniques, four metrics are 
introduced. (1) The first is the total throughput of network background data as well as 
that value scaled per OBU. This looks at how much data the other vehicles are able to 
acquire in the presence of 100 vehicles focused solely on PN refill. Given that those 
vehicles that require PNs receive them, an increase in this number demonstrates 
improvement. (2) The second metric is the number of PNs received by the PN refill 
OBUs. Given that all of these vehicles are examining their PN store and potentially 
seeking PNs, higher numbers are better. (3) Another metric is the maximum number of 
PNs any OBU received. Given that a portion of the vehicles are very low on PNs, the 
more this number increases the more improvement we witness. (4) Finally, we group the 
PN refill OBUs in bins based upon their fill status (number of PNs divided by the 
maximum number of PNs that can be stored) and look at the performance of the various 
techniques on each of these bins. The greater this number for low percentage bins, the 
more effective a particular technique is in providing PNs to vehicles closer to running 
out. 
5.2.9 Simulation Results 
This section outlines the results achieved through ns-3 simulation. All values were 
derived following the methods outlined in [99] to obtain a 95% confidence interval with a 
half-width of the mean simulated value of 5% for the baseline and static threshold 
scenarios and 10% for the probabilistic with static threshold scenario. Each simulation 
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run lasted 30 seconds of simulation time. In each scenario, one hundred vehicles were 
involved in the PN refill process. These vehicles either requested PNs the entire duration 
of the simulation, if they had less than a certain threshold, or only randomly if they had 
less than a certain threshold. The baseline method is on the far left, the static threshold 
method is in the middle, and the probabilistic with static threshold is on the right for this 
and all graphs. 
Background Data Traffic 
Figure 28 presents the average results across all methods and for all three OBU 
traffic densities of 175, 200, and 225 vehicles. For the baseline case, as additional 
vehicles were added, the total amount of background data received increased, but the 
amount each OBU received decreased, most likely due to increased channel contention. 
The total background traffic in the static threshold method increased as additional 
vehicles were added when the static threshold was greater than approximately 50%. For 
static threshold values below approximately 30%, the amount of bandwidth available for 
background traffic decreased as the vehicle density increased. The probabilistic with 
static threshold method showed a similar trend. Figure 29 demonstrates that in all cases 
the amount of background data decreased, on average, per vehicle involved. 
Pseudonym Refill 
Figure 30 presents the total pseudonym data traffic throughput for each of the 
methods and each of the vehicle traffic densities. In every case, as the vehicle density 
increased, the average number of PNs that were able to be acquired decreased. 




Figure 28. Total background data received. 
 




Figure 30. Total PN data received. 
scenario whereby the maximum number of PNs were able to be distributed compared 
with the other methods. One might conclude that it represents the “best” approach to PN 
distribution, but as will shortly be seen, this is directly dependent on one’s definition of 
“best” and probably does not represent the best approach. 
A final look at the total received data (Figure 31) reiterates that as expected an 
increasing number of OBUs results in a decreased overall throughput. What is less 
obvious from the previous graphs is that even with increased vehicle density, it is 
possible to achieve increased performance (i.e. greater overall data throughput) by 
limiting which vehicles seek PNs. For example, in the second distribution method shown 
in Figure 31 in the extreme case of only vehicles with less than 10% of PNs requesting 





Figure 31. Aggregate background and PN data. 
 
Figure 32. Total data received broken down by data type (200 OBU case). 
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In order to show the impact of the various PN distribution techniques on other 
background applications (whether administrative or otherwise) sharing the same channel, 
Figure 32 shows the relative data throughput for the 200 OBU case. 
Maximum number of PNs Distributed 
While overall throughout is important, for the purposes of PN distribution, it may 
be necessary to maximize how many PNs one can distribute to a single vehicle. Figure 33 
demonstrates this result. As can be seen, by reducing the number of vehicles requesting 
PNs, even in the presence of other data traffic, the number of PNs received by the 
remaining PN OBUs increases. 
Distribution of PNs Distributed 
As an extension of viewing the maximum number of PNs distributed, it is also 
instructive to examine how the distribution of PNs affects vehicles with various levels of 
stored PNs. Figure 34 illustrates this point and shows that when all vehicles are equitably 
seeking PNs, as in the baseline case, they each receive a relatively equal amount. 
However, a relatively equal distribution of PNs may not be the goal when vehicles with 
very few PNs are present. In such circumstances, a method that discriminates the PNs 
based upon their need is better suited to deliver more PNs to these vehicles (and may 
result in the greatest number of PNs being delivered overall – but not the most overall 
data). Figure 35 adds emphasis to this somewhat surprising result by illustrating a side-
by-side comparison of PNs delivered to sets of OBUs whose members started with less 




Figure 33. Maximum number of PNs received by a single OBU. 
 




Figure 35. Closer examination of those OBUs starting with the fewest PNs. 
Summary of Results 
From the foregoing discussion, it has been demonstrated in densely populated 
vehicular environments that the number of PNs distributed increases by reducing the 
number of OBUs accessing the shared medium. The best way to reduce who is seeking 
PNs ought to be based upon need, and of the three methods introduced, the last method 
performed the best. The final method with a threshold of 50%, for example, allowed for 
more total data throughput than the baseline case or the static 50% threshold, as shown in 
Figure 32. More importantly, method 3 provided the greatest number of PNs to those 
OBUs closest to being empty, as shown in Figure 34; thus it could be argued that it 




5.2.10 Section Summary 
As has been shown in this section, an equitable distribution policy may not be 
“best” in providing PNs to vehicles. Such a policy may make it more likely that those 
cars with the fewest PNs do not receive a sufficient number of PNs to last before reaching 
another RSU. In 30 seconds with an RSU in the urban environment we simulated, the 
baseline method of granting equal priority to PN distribution resources only provided a 
maximum of 650 PNs (less than half a day’s worth) over 30 seconds in the 200 OBU 
case. 
In the presence of congestion, only a limited number of PNs can be distributed. 
When only the OBUs that “urgently” need PNs request them, those “urgently” needing 
PNs receive more than compared to the equitable distribution policy scenario. Thus the 
best performance in terms of PN distribution among the three techniques we examined 
was achieved with a 25% to 50% static threshold (which eliminated 75% to 50% of the 
OBUs vying for PNs) coupled with a request of PNs which was directly proportional to 
need as measured by the PN storage level of each OBU. Such a method resulted in almost 
eight times the number of PNs being distributed exclusively to those with less than half 
of their PN capacities filled. 
5.3 Effect of Data Transmission Prioritization 
A method within networking to optimize the use of bandwidth and provide, in 
some cases, service guarantees is known as Quality of Service (QoS). While normally 
thought of as a means to ensure real time applications, such as voice and video, have 
priority on a network so latency is minimized, the use of QoS can more broadly be used 
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to provide certain data transmissions a greater likelihood of successful reception. For 
wireless networks, enhanced channel data access (ECDA) is codified in IEEE standard 
802.11e [137] for general wireless networks and amended for use in vehicles by 802.11p 
[138]. While others have investigated the use of QoS for routing, such as [139-141], we 
are unaware of any studies of using QoS in the distribution of PNs from the VANET 
infrastructure to OBUs in the vehicular network. 
5.3.1 Contribution 
This work extends the research conducted in the previous section into various 
methods to distribute PNs within a downtown environment consisting of roads forming a 
grid. This work specifically looks at two additional QoS-related methods and their impact 
in the same inner city environment. Furthermore, both the previous non-QoS and current 
QoS-related methods are examined in a new environment: an urban controlled-access 
motorway. In support of this effort to enumerate methods to improve pseudonym 
distribution in congested environments, this work demonstrates through the use of ns-3 
[95] simulation, an additional, novel technique that can be viewed as a “light-weight” 
QoS method. The goal of this method of reduced complexity and requiring no lower layer 
support is to allow for greater utilization of VANET channels while increasing the 
likelihood that those vehicles with the greatest need will acquire the pseudonyms they 
require. This section demonstrates that such a method can achieve almost identical 





Traffic Congestion - Highway 
To determine what constitutes a reasonable measure of congestion for this portion 
of our research for a highway scenario, we analyzed traffic data from automatic traffic 
recorder (ATR) 5468 as published by the State of Georgia (USA) Department of 
Transportation. From this study, we found that 277,155 vehicles traveled past a point per 
24 hour weekday on a roadway classified by the State of Georgia as an “urban interstate 
principal artery” that lies in downtown Atlanta and is shown in Figure 36 [135, 142]. In 
order to focus on a highly congested scenario, we used this entire count of vehicles but 
restricted it over a mere six hours. This yielded 46,192 vehicles per hour or 
approximately 385 vehicles over 30 seconds. We then modeled a single RSU slightly off-
center of 14 traffic lanes (reflecting this portion of the highway) stretching 280 meters, 
140 meters in each direction from the RSU. Thus for our topography, the average number 
of vehicles we would expect to see over a simulated interval of 30 seconds is 385 and for 
this reason we ran simulations with 400 vehicles. Of these, all were considered to be 




Figure 36. Location of ATR 5468 along interstate 75/85 in Atlanta, GA. 
Traffic Congestion – Inner City 
A similar analysis was conducted for the inner city case without quality of service 
functionality in our work in [143]. While that work did not include QoS or a highway 
topography, it did provide a baseline of PN distribution from which the presently 
discussed work will be compared to in order to understand the effects of QoS in a 
congested, grid-like roadway topography. In addition, and in contrast to the highway 
scenario, the inner-city scenario looked at vehicle densities of 175, 200, and 225 vehicles. 
In recognition of the potential for shared applications within a single service channel, PN 
refill activity was limited to only the first 100 vehicles. The remaining vehicles were 
engaged in background data transfer over the same shared channel.  
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Our work seeks to understand the relationship of PN distribution with the 
potential for other data, whether administrative or not, also being disseminated, as well as 
looking at the exclusive use of a channel for PN distribution. Thus for both topographies 
we examined the successfulness of vehicles getting PNs and for the inner city, the effects 
of the PN refill process on the ability of other vehicles to receive non-PN data (labeled 
“background”) under the various techniques.  
5.3.3 Simulation Model Assumptions 
A series of assumptions were made in an effort to demonstrate the effect of 
various pseudonym distribution policies. When an OBU seeks PNs, it is going to need to 
request them from the certificate or registration authority [69, 90] and some time will 
have to elapse between this request and when the RSU can begin transmitting the PNs. 
We are assuming a best case scenario such that the PNs are already calculated and at the 
RSU for immediate distribution. 
As for the vehicles themselves, in the highway topography, the vehicles travel in a 
straight line at a speed randomly selected between 5 and 20 MPH (2.235 and 8.941 m/s). 
Speed changes occur every seven seconds to represent a typical highly congested 
scenario. In the inner city grid topography, each OBU’s mobility is independent but 
constrained to make 90 degree turns (randomly selected) and stay within the 150 m x 150 
m area of observation. It is assumed that for each vehicle that would have left this area, 
another one would take its place. Since we are ultimately concerned with the overall 
performance, aggregating the results provides the best indication of how various 
techniques would affect the overall system. 
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We assume that each OBU securely stores a cache of PNs on a trusted computing 
platform. We assume the use of each PN for a one minute validity period, as in [136], and 
the possession of PNs for every hour of the day. Furthermore, we assume each OBU can 
store up to a year’s worth of PNs (60 minutes/hour x 24 hours/day x 365 days/year = 
525,600 PNs/year). The amount of PNs each OBU starts with at the beginning of the 
simulation is evenly distributed from zero to the 525,600 and fixed across each run such 
that the vehicles have a wide range of PNs in their possession. We used the same 
communication range values as in Section 5.2. 
In the inner city simulations, we used a Poisson transmission rate of 100 packets 
per second of 1024 bytes each for the background traffic, which was sent by the RSU to 
each OBU not involved in PN refill. PNs were distributed such that for each service 
channel interval in range when a request has been received, the RSU sends the requesting 
OBU 10 packets of 1000 bytes of data each. IEEE 1609.2 defines each PN to be 153 
bytes and we assume that PNs can span multiple transmissions and can be concatenated 
together [26]. 
5.3.4 PN Distribution Techniques 
In addition to possibly using wired PN transmission with regular periodic PN 
refill as in [39], some researchers have suggested that vehicles simply request PNs 
whenever they are in contact with an RSU [62, 65]. Concern lies with how many PNs a 
vehicle can obtain as well as the overall impact on bandwidth on neighboring vehicles. 
This issue is what the research outlined in this section seeks to gain insight upon, 
specifically with the use of QoS or a QoS-like mechanism. In so doing, five techniques 
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are introduced and their performance impact measured through simulation. Given that 
VANETs have yet to be deployed, none of these techniques have currently been proposed 
for use. 
The first technique we implemented is a “baseline” (shown as BL in the figures) 
such that all vehicles constantly seek PNs (if they are one of the PN-designated OBUs) or 
data from the RSU (if they are one of the background traffic OBUs). The second 
technique we investigated was a binary logic or static threshold method such that vehicles 
only sought additional PNs if they had less than a specified threshold of PNs stored 
onboard. This was performed for the threshold cases of 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 
90 percent “full.” Thus if the threshold was set at 40% and an OBU only had 39% of its 
capacity of PNs, it would request PNs until it reached 40% full. 
The third technique we investigated applied a probabilistic component to the refill 
question such that the likelihood an OBU sought additional PNs was inversely 
proportional to the number of PNs it possessed. For this reason we refer to it as the 
probabilistic with static threshold method. The fewer PNs an OBU possesses, the more 
likely the OBU will request PNs. The probabilistic component utilizes a static threshold 
combined with a random number to control when a PN request is made. As an example, 
if an OBU had 22% of its PN capacity and the static threshold was set at 25%, the OBU 
would uniformly select a random number between zero and .25 and if that number was 
greater than its present capacity the OBU would request PNs during that service channel 
interval. On the other hand, if the threshold remained 25% and it had 40% of its PN 
capacity, the random number chosen would never exceed .25 and it would never request 
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PNs until its cache was reduced to below 25%. We examined threshold cases of 25, 50, 
75, and 100 percent. 
The fourth method of PN distribution implemented a QoS-like mechanism to 
underlying hardware with no QoS support (in ns-3, this was implemented through the use 
of the NqosWifiMacHelper class). This “light-weight” approach simply assigned a 
“roughly equivalent access category” (reAC) to each transmission based upon the fill 
level of an OBU’s PNs. The goal here is not to replace the full functionality of QoS, but 
rather implement a simple and straightforward means of giving priority to certain packets 
while preserving some sense of the values used in QoS. These reAC’s then provide a 
range of delay times before an OBU or RSU would transmit information comprised of a 
fixed value (equivalent to arbitrary inter-frame space number, or AIFSN) and a randomly 
selected value for the “roughly equivalent contention window” (reCW). The values used 
in this approach are enumerated in Table 18. The sum of the reAIFSN and randomly 
chosen reCW are then multiplied by the slot time (defined as 16 μs in IEEE 802.11p 
standard for MAC QoS enhancements for wireless access in vehicular environments 
[138]). This fourth method was conducted such that the thresholds for each roughly 
equivalent access category was varied and are given in Table 19. Note that the last row 
represents thresholds for one day, one week, and one month. Thus in the first case, an 
OBU that is 20% full would use reAC VO while one 85% full would use reAC BK. In 
the fourth case, an OBU that has 2% of the possible number of PNs that can be stored 
would us reAC VI but should that OBU achieve a level of 2.5%, it would switch to using 
reAC BE until it had reached a level of 5%. 
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Table 18. Values for roughly equivalent method of quality of service. 
 
Table 19. Thresholds for each reQoS and QoS trial. 
 
The final method analyzed is the implementation of IEEE 802.11e as amended by 
802.11p as provided by ns-3. In order to implement this in the real world, all participants 
in the VANET will have to support QoS. This also adds some overhead to the network 
and could potentially open the network to abuse by nodes using higher priorities than 
appropriate. For this reason, it is unknown whether VANETs will support total QoS 
functionality. The same five cases listed in Table 19 were used for this QoS method. 
5.3.5 Model Metrics 
In order to shed some light on the issue of PN distribution in congested 
environments and the performance of the various proposed techniques, four metrics were 
used. (1) Total throughput of network background data is the first and it applies only to 
the inner city grid topography. This looks at how much data the other (75, 100, or 125) 
vehicles are able to acquire in the presence of the 100 vehicles focused solely on PN 
reAC Description reCWmin reCWmax reAIFSN
BK Background 0 15 7
BE Best Effort 0 7 3
VI Video 0 3 2







1 25% 50% 75%
2 10% 25% 50%
3 5% 10% 20%
4 1% 2.5% 5%
5 0.3% 1.9% 8.3%
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refill, as discussed in 0. To compare among the different vehicle densities, this metric has 
been normalized to the number of vehicles involved. Given that those vehicles that 
require PNs receive them, an increase in this number demonstrates improvement. (2) The 
second metric is the number of PNs received by the PN refill OBUs. Given that all of 
these vehicles are examining their PN store and potentially seeking PNs, higher numbers 
are better. (3) Another metric is the maximum number of PNs any OBU received. Given 
that a portion of the vehicles are very low on PNs, the more this number increases the 
more improvement we witness. (4) Finally, the last metric quantifies the increase of PNs 
over the simulation based on how many PNs an OBU has at the start of the simulation. 
We group the PN refill OBUs in bins based upon their percent filled status at the start of 
the simulation run (number of PNs divided by the maximum number of PNs that can be 
stored) and look at the performance of the various techniques on each of these bins. The 
greater this number for low percentage bins, the more effective a particular technique is 
in providing PNs to vehicles closer to running out of them. 
5.3.6 Simulation Results 
This section outlines the results achieved through ns-3 simulation of the five 
methods discussed in section 5.3.4. All values were derived following the methods 
outlined in [99] to obtain a 95% confidence interval (CI). The upper and lower CI bounds 
for each measurement are displayed on the graphs directly. Each simulation run covered 




Highway Scenario: Pseudonym Refill 
In each of the methods for the highway scenario, four hundred vehicles were 
involved in the PN refill process. These vehicles either requested PNs the entire duration 
of the simulation (although potentially with different delays/access categories) or only if 
they had less than a certain threshold of PNs stored (sometimes with a certain 
randomness included). Figure 37 presents the total pseudonym data traffic throughput for 
each of the methods. In terms of the first two methods after the baseline, the increase of 
the threshold resulted in fewer PNs being distributed. In terms of the roughly equivalent 
QoS and true QoS methods, tightening the threshold for higher access categories resulted 
in more PNs being distributed above a certain threshold. With the thresholds too 
stringent, fewer PNs were actually distributed. Overall, all four techniques at any setting 
distributed more PNs than the baseline method and the greatest number of PNs were 
distributed using the 10% static threshold followed by the 5%-10%-20% QoS and QoS-
like methods which had nearly identical performance, and then the 20% static and 25% 
dynamic threshold methods which also had very close performance. 
 




Figure 38. Maximum number of PNs received by any single OBU. 
Highway Scenario: Maximum number of PNs Distributed 
As discussed in the previous section, for the purposes of PN distribution, it may 
be necessary to maximize how many PNs one can distribute to a single vehicle. Figure 38 
demonstrates this result. The maximum number of PNs were delivered to a single vehicle 
using the 25% dynamic threshold method. The 10% static threshold was second best in 
this metric. The 1-2.5-5 and .3-1.9-8.3 QoS-like methods were third best with the same 
thresholds being approximately equal in the true QoS method coming in fourth.  
Highway Scenario: Distribution of PNs Distributed 
As an extension of viewing the maximum number of PNs distributed, it is also 
instructive to examine how the distribution of PNs affects vehicles with various levels of 
stored PNs. Figure 39 illustrates this point and shows that when all vehicles are equitably 
seeking PNs, as in the baseline case, they each receive a relatively equal amount. 
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However, a relatively equal distribution of PNs may not be the goal when vehicles with 
very few PNs are present. In such circumstances, a method that distributes the PNs based 
upon their need is better suited to deliver more PNs to these vehicles (and may result in 
the greatest number of PNs being delivered overall – but not the most overall data). 
Figure 39 also demonstrates that a strategy to how QoS might be implemented is an 
important factor. Setting the thresholds too liberally such that too many vehicles are 
transmitting at high priority results in fewer PNs being distributed. Setting the threshold 
too tightly can also have a deleterious effect. Interestingly, these results mirror those of 
the previous metric. 
 




Inner City Scenario: Background Data Traffic 
Figure 40 presents the average results of total received background data across all 
five methods and for all three OBU traffic densities of 175, 200, and 225 vehicles for the 
inner city topography. We see that the per OBU data decreases without exception for the 
baseline, static, and probabilistic methods as the number of vehicles seeking background 
data increases. In the QoS-like and QoS cases, there is a slight increase in the amount of 
background date received for 125 background OBUs compared to only 100, but both 
receive less than the 75 background OBU case. The most background data is transmitted 
in the 10% static threshold case followed by the 20% static and 25% static with 
probabilistic threshold cases. 
Inner City Scenario: Pseudonym Refill 
In each inner city scenario, one hundred vehicles were involved in the PN refill 
process. With limited bandwidth, a portion of what is available is bound to be used for 
PN data transmission and a portion for the background data. Figure 41 illustrates, for the 
200 OBU case, how these proportions change for the various methods. In the QoS-like 
case and especially in the QoS case, the background data receives the least proportion of 
the available bandwidth. 
Figure 42 presents the total pseudonym data traffic throughput for each of the 
methods and each of the vehicle traffic densities. In every case except the first three QoS 
thresholds, as the vehicle density increased, the average number of PNs that were able to 
be acquired decreased. In terms of the first three methods, the baseline data represented 
the scenario whereby the maximum number of PNs were able to be distributed. However 
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when the pseudo-QoS and true QoS methods are compared to these, the QoS-associated 
methods demonstrate a marked increase in the amount of PN data delivered.  
Inner City Scenario: Maximum number of PNs Distributed 
Figure 43 demonstrates for the first three methods that reducing the number of 
vehicles requesting PNs, even in the presence of other data traffic, the number of PNs 
received by the remaining PN OBUs increases. For the final two methods where all 
vehicles are requesting PNs but with different priorities, we again see a similar but not 
absolute trend. 
 




Figure 41. Total data received broken down by data type (200 OBU case). 
 




Figure 43. Maximum number of PNs received by a single OBU. 
5.3.7 Distribution of PNs Distributed 
As before, it is instructive to examine how the distribution of PNs affects vehicles 
with various levels of stored PNs. Figure 44 illustrates this point and shows that when all 
vehicles are equitably seeking PNs, as in the baseline case, they each receive a relatively 
equal amount. However, a relatively equal distribution of PNs may not be the goal when 
vehicles with very few PNs are present. In such circumstances, a method that 
discriminates the PNs based upon their need is better suited to deliver more PNs to these 
vehicles (and may result in the greatest number of PNs being delivered overall – but not 
the most overall data). Figure 44 also demonstrates that a strategy to how QoS might be 
implemented is an important factor. Setting the thresholds too liberally such that too 
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many vehicles are transmitting at high priority results in fewer PNs being distributed. 
Setting the threshold too tightly can also have a deleterious effect. 
 
Figure 44. Breakdown of PNs received by OBU PN fill level (200 OBU case). 
5.3.8 Section Summary 
The results of this section further reinforce that an equitable distribution policy 
may not be “best” in providing PNs to vehicles. In 30 seconds with an RSU in two urban 
scenarios we simulated, the baseline method of granting equal priority to PN distribution 
resources only provided a maximum of 400 PNs (less than half a day’s) over 30 seconds 
in the 200 OBU case. On the other hand, once again we have shown that reducing the 
amount of requests for PNs positively effects the system performance. In this section we 
have extended this concept to show that the best performance in terms of PN distribution 
among the five techniques we examined was achieved with a QoS based PN distribution 
scheme. Such a method resulted in an increase of 25 – 800% compared to other methods. 
The implementation of QoS, or even a simpler method similar to QoS that requires no 
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hardware support demonstrated substantial increases in PN distribution and hold much 
promise as being part of the solution to ensuring all OBU communication can be both 
secure and private. 
5.4 Impact of PN Pre-computation and Subsequent Pre-distribution (including 
the Effects of OBU/RSU Cooperation and Various RSU Forwarding Techniques) 
In this section, we examine the impact of having pseudonyms readily available for 
distribution when the vehicle requests them and how cooperation between OBUs and 
RSUs affects pre-distribution of these PNs. Extensive simulation was performed to 
estimate a reasonable delay to generate the pseudonyms. A generic roadway grid was 
then analyzed to estimate the performance of various pseudonym forwarding methods. 
Finally we considered three cases of vehicular traffic densities given probabilities of zero 
to one hundred percent that the pseudonyms are immediately available for transmission. 
From this work, we conclude that not having pseudonyms available for transmission 
adversely affects system performance and could be a good design enhancement for 
vehicular networks.   
While considerable work has been performed in the area of routing within 
VANETs (see [131] for a summary) as well as the overhead associated with computing 
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) in the functioning of VANETs 
[144], little research has been conducted on the unique problem of pseudonym 
distribution. This section examines the question of whether or not RSUs having PNs 
when an OBU requests them impacts the number of PNs a vehicle can obtain and if there 
125 
 
is an impact, what is its extent. We conducted intensive simulations and validated our 
assumptions using the built-in OpenSSL benchmarking tool, MATLAB, and ns-3.  
5.4.1 Assumptions Regarding the Refill Process 
There are many ways for a vehicle to acquire PNs, such as through a physical 
USB connection or over a cellular or WiMax connection (requiring additional hardware 
and a service provider). Whether or not it is the primary means of PN distribution, it 
seems that vehicular networks should have this capability organically, especially when 
considering implementing regions to partition the global roadway infrastructure. While it 
may be possible for a vehicle to have a lifetime of PNs pre-installed for use within a 
given region, when it crosses logical borders within an authority or international borders 
(ex: driving from China to Russia), the ability to distribute PNs through the VANET 
becomes even more important. 
It is assumed that when an OBU requires PNs, and upon receiving a beacon from 
an RSU advertising this service, it will transmit a request. When the RSU receives the 
request it will either transmit PNs to the OBU if it possesses them or acquire and then 
transmit them. As long as the OBU needs PNs and is in range of the RSU, it continues to 
receive them. Once it is out of range, the RSU can either do nothing or potentially 
forward the remaining PNs to other RSU(s).  
In terms of communication range, we again used ns-3’s Three-Log propagation 
loss model with parameter values from Section 4.5 as published in [106] to limit 





It is unlikely that every RSU would immediately have PNs for every vehicle. 
Given that the default service channel interval for dedicated short range communication 
(DSRC) is only approximately 46 ms [22], the delay in acquiring PNs to distribute is 
likely to impact how many PNs an OBU can acquire. One of the purposes of the research 
presented in this section is to provide insight into this issue. 
Pseudonym Subsequent Pre-Computation 
By pseudonym pre-computation we mean the process by which PNs are computed 
by RSUs prior to an OBU travelling within range of said RSU and requesting PNs. This 
is a measure of the greatest delay likely to be encountered when an OBU requests PNs 
from an RSU that does not presently have them and they are not in existence. It is 
possible, as discussed above, for PNs to be computed many different ways.  
We are assuming for economy of scale reasoning that the PNs are computed in a 
distributed manner by the registration authorities (RAs) at the RSUs. (This method is 
considered in this work as opposed to a third party or via the OBUs themselves. The PNs 
may be signed by either the RSU acting as a RA whose certificate in turn is signed by the 
CA or could be transmitted to the CA for signing. While rogue RSUs may be deployed, 
we assume that the CA/RA periodically transmits a list of known good RSUs and only 
those are part of the RSUs that participate in PN forwarding. We have considered any 
infrastructure network delay this may introduce as negligible since we are focused here 
on pseudonym computation delay, however if this additional delay is not negligible, the 
results of this research become even more important because of the longer delays.) This 
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means that computer hardware roughly equivalent to computers generally available in 
university labs would provide sufficient processing power to simulate our configuration. 
Thus in [145] we generated in C++ [146] on such computers certificates for the OBUs as 
defined in IEEE 1609.2 [26] using the nistp224 elliptic curve (in accordance with IEEE 
1363 [147]) using OpenSSL in  both 32 bit and 64 bit Windows using both the Microsoft 
Visual Studio 2010 Professional [148] and MinGW/gcc [149] compilers/integrated 
development environments. 
Pseudonym Pre-distribution/Forwarding 
By pseudonym pre-distribution/forwarding we mean the process by which PNs 
are forwarded to RSUs prior to an OBU travelling within range of said RSU and 
requesting PNs. We examined seven potential PN forwarding techniques for RSUs. Our 
goal is not to use all of these and identify when, but rather compare these various 
methods and glean insight from their relative performance. (1) The first is the GPS 
method in which the OBU communicates exactly which path it will follow. It is true that 
providing the network with one’s path does impact privacy, but the general goal is to 
protect one’s privacy from outside observers and such entities would still not be privy to 
this information. (2) Another option is a regional flood such that the remaining PNs are 
forwarded to all the other RSUs in a given region. (3) A third method involved 
forwarding the remaining PNs to all the adjacent RSUs – the first RSU encountered 
sectored by 45 degrees of arc. (4) The next method introduced involved forwarding the 
remaining PNs to the closest three RSUs. (5) The fifth method simply forwarded PNs to 
the two closest RSUs. (6) The sixth method used a fixed distance and forwarded the 
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remaining PNs to all RSUs within that fixed distance. (7) The final method analyzed 
involved no forwarding. 
The topology of the road network used in this phase of the research is provided in 
Figure 45 with the RSU locations indicated by diamonds. 
 
Figure 45. Road network and RSU placement used to determine probability RSUs had 
PNs when requested. 
Traffic Conditions 
Once the delay was calculated for the first PNs to be distributed assuming they 
were not pre-computed and the probability an OBU would encounter such a delay, the 
second phase of this research was to use ns-3 to simulate OBUs in the presence of 
multiple RSUs (using the probabilities of delays obtained in the first phase of the 
research) to measure the impact of the various delay probabilities. In real life, the traffic 





















density will have a significant effect on VANET performance, with greater levels of 
congestion likely to have the worst impact. 
For this purpose, three different scenarios were defined as summarized in Table 
20. RSUs were simulated with the various densities of OBUs from the minimum to 
maximum values with each density simulated 30 times. The speeds were randomly 
selected for each vehicle from the minimum to maximum value and changed every ten 
seconds or 200 meters. In order to focus on the interaction of a set space, a multi-lane 
highway scenario was chosen with the vehicles equally distributed in each direction. A 
dense RSU scenario was examined that was 600 meters in extent with the RSUs placed 
150 meters apart with the OBUs initially placed 10 m from each other with 10 m lane 
spacing.  All simulations were run for 30 seconds of simulated time and the simulation 
communications range was the same as the previous two sections. 
Table 20. Vehicular traffic density scenario configuration. 
 
5.4.2 Time Delay to Compute PNs 
In order to estimate the amount of delay involved in order to compute PNs, the 
appropriate environment was coded and benchmarking was performed [145] using the 
built-in functionality of OpenSSL. The OpenSSL self-benchmarking functionality 
measures most cryptographic capabilities, but our focus was on the Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography and specifically the Elliptic Curve Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). Prior to 
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calculating the PN generation times, we examined basic cryptographic functionality to 
compare performance among the various processors and compilers. These results, for 
both signing and verifying OBU certificates, are contained in Table 21. As can be seen, 
the best performance in terms of the maximum number of signing (creating) per second 
and the number of verifying (checking) per second operations was achieved using the 64 
bit processor and the gcc compiler. As such, we limited future work to this best case 
scenario given VANETs are likely to implement similar hardware and software. 
In terms of PN generation, we determined that 287 certificates could be generated 
per second. Given an example protocol of sending ~1000 bytes of PNs per packet (this 
value was selected to balance unnecessary overhead from smaller packets with larger 
packet sizes that increase the likelihood of collisions and other transmission errors), and 
that each PN is 153 bytes, this yields seven PNs being sent per service channel interval, 
and thus a creation delay of 24.4 ms. We conservatively estimate processing, queuing, 
transmission, and propagation delay to be 1.4 ms. Thus for the purposes of this 
simulation, we introduce a delay of 25.8 ms prior to an RSU replying to a PN request 
message if it is determined to not have the PNs in its memory. 
Table 21. Basic cryptographic function benchmark results. 
 
5.4.3 RSU Pseudonym Forwarding 
Given that a delay does exist should an RSU have to either generate PNs or 
request them from a Certificate Authority (CA) or a non-resident Registration Authority 
224 bit w32‐gcc47 w64‐gcc47 w32‐vc w64‐vc
sign/s 3618 6233.4 3635.9 4934.4
verify/s 767.4 1395.5 778.2 1069.9
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(RA), minimizing the number of times an OBU requests PNs from an RSU that does not 
have them will improve the overall ability of the VANET to transmit PNs. We examined 
the seven forwarding techniques enumerated in Section 5.4.1 to determine the likelihood 
an OBU would encounter RSUs that would not possess them. These results are given in 
Table 22. The first column indicates the average percentage of the time for a given 
method that the PNs were not immediately available when the OBU encountered an RSU. 
The second column indicates the average percentage of PN forwarding transmissions to 
an RSU that either never encountered the OBU for which the PNs were generated or 
already had them from a previous forwarding incident 
Table 22. PN forwarding method comparison. 
 
While these measurements are subject to variation due to topology and 
forwarding method configuration, our purpose was to evaluate the different techniques in 
order to justify the probability settings for the work in section 5.4.4. It is also difficult to 
determine which has a greater negative impact: time delay or wasted transmissions. 
Given the ephemeral nature of VANETs, it is most likely time delay is that one would 
like to minimize. 
Figure 46 provides a visual comparison of the results of the seven methods. The 
GPS guided system that has the PNs pre-forwarded to just those RSUs has the expected 
Method Avg % Delay Avg Wasted Tx Sum
Fixed Range 65% 51% 116%
2 Closest RSUs 51% 57% 108%
3 Closest RSUs 41% 64% 105%
Adjacent RSUs 32% 72% 104%
No Forwarding 100% 0% 100%
Flood Region 28% 53% 82%
GPS 0% 0% 0%
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delay and unnecessary transmissions of zero while flooding the region results in 
experiencing a delay roughly 25% of the time. Forwarding the PNs to the closest two or 
three RSUs resulted in RSUs not having PNs to distribute roughly 50% of the time. The 
fixed range method resulted in a delay 65% of the time. Given these results, we simulated 
the impact of PN availability on moving vehicles from 100% to 0% availability in 25% 
increments. 
 
Figure 46. PN forwarding method comparison. 
5.4.4 Impact of PN Availability 
Having established a reasonable value to use for delay (25.8 ms) and reasonable 
values for the likelihood an OBU would encounter an RSU along its path that would not 
possess PNs to distribute to it (0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%), we proceeded to 
simulate in ns-3 for the vehicle speeds and densities listed in Table 20 and for both a 
dense and sparse RSU distribution to measure its impact. For the dense RSU case,   
Figure 47 is an example of the results for all five delay scenarios under light 
traffic conditions. Figure 48and Figure 49 illustrate the medium and heavy traffic 
conditions. The behavior is similar for each scenario with increasing separation between 




Figure 47. Simulation performance for light traffic scenario (dense RSU distribution). 
 




Figure 49. Simulation performance for heavy traffic scenario (dense RSU distribution). 
When the numbers are more closely examined in tabular form (see Table 23), the 
impact can be more clearly seen. Here one sees that under light vehicular density 
conditions, OBUs receive about one to two percent less PNs than they would if the PNs 
were always available for distribution to the OBUs. However in the medium case, the 
impact of not having PNs to distribute when an OBU requests them increases 
considerably with each quintile. While it was expected that the heavy vehicular density 
case would have the greatest impact, its almost 20% magnitude was surprising. It would 
seem the added problem of congestion really limits how many packets a vehicle can 




Table 23. Average impact of PN availability for various traffic conditions 
 
5.4.5 Section Summary 
In this section we have examined another aspect of PN distribution: the impact of 
having PNs available at RSUs for immediate delivery when an OBU contacts them and 
requests them. Through the use of OpenSSL and ns-3 simulation, we have demonstrated 
that PN pre-computation and pre-distribution is a worthwhile idea that can greatly assist 
in the PN distribution process, especially in congested environments. Doing so is likely to 
result in the distribution of anywhere from .4% to 19.6% more pseudonyms than a 
VANET infrastructure that does not support these under dense RSU distributions and a 
smaller performance enhancement in sparser RSU environments. 
5.5 Comparison of WSMP to TCP 
Throughout this work, the WAVE Short Message Protocol (a simplified version 
of the universal datagram protocol, UDP) was assumed to be used. An interesting thought 
was to see how using the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) would affect 
performance. A simple scenario was established using the trace file discussed in Section 
4.7.1 with 100 to 1000 OBUs in 100 OBU increments was conducted with eight RSUs 





Figure 50.  View of trace file roadway network and RSU positioning. 
The results of this simulation run demonstrated rapidly that using TCP negatively 
affected performance and WSMP is a better selection. Overall, TCP distributed almost 
half of the amount of PN data compared with WSMP as shown in Figure 51 and Figure 
52. The dramatic increase in data transmitted between 100 and 200 OBUs can be 
attributed to a larger number of OBUs more geographically disperse and able to 
communicate in a relatively congestion free radio environment. 


























Figure 51. Total PN data received by all OBUs: TCP vs WSMP. 
 





NEW COMPREHENSIVE METHOD OF PSEUDONYM 
DISTRIBUTION 
6  
6.1 Pseudonym Distribution Protocol (PNDP) 
From the preceding sections we arrive at our final recommendations for a 
comprehensive PN distribution method. In Chapter 2 we reviewed the security, including 
privacy, considerations and requirements of VANETs. The implementation ideas found 
throughout the literature were discussed in Sections 3.1 through 3.3. Our designed VPKI 
was then developed and presented in Sections 3.4 through 3.7. Chapter 4 discussed our 
simulation configuration and the research we conducted in building a realistic 
propagation and fading loss model as well as discussed the use of actual vehicle position 
data provided as trace files for the most realistic large-scale mobility simulation. Our 
research presented in Section 5.2 demonstrated the value in restricting PN refill from all 
vehicles all the time (as proposed by some other authors) to only those in need. In Section 
5.3 we show that using QoS (or if this will not be supported in VANETs, a light-weight 
equivalent protocol we designed that requires no hardware support) further improves the 
VPKI’s ability to deliver PNs most effectively. Our PNDP protocol was further refined 
with the additional infrastructure support of PN pre-computation and subsequent pre-
distribution as discussed in Section 5.4. Finally our intuitive decision to use WSMP over 
TCP was validated in Section 5.5. 
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In tying all of the lessons learned through this research, we believe we have 
demonstrated improved design features that result in an improved method for the 
comprehensive and universal distribution of pseudonyms in hybrid ephemeral vehicular 
networks.  
6.2 Simulation Results 
To see the difference between a baseline PN distribution method and the one 
above, we conducted a large scale simulation over 60 seconds for 1000 OBUs with the 
realistic mobility trace file and using the other simulation parameters of Chapter 4. As 
our baseline, we assumed that all OBUs requested PNs at all times, no QoS is 
implemented, and no PN pre-computation or forwarding was affected. For our protocol, 
we implemented QoS to suppress requests from OBUs with many PNs when others with 
few PNs were in the vicinity and we assumed GPS coordination between OBUs and 
RSUs was present to provide 100% effectiveness of PN pre-computation and forwarding. 
The size of the PN packet was 1071 bytes, representing seven PNs. 
The final results of our protocol compared to the baseline protocol just described 
are illustrated in Figure 53. For 750, 1000, and 1250 OBU scenarios using the most 
realistic mobility trace model, PNDP outperforms a baseline method by an average of 
36.1%. In all, we have conclusively shown that how PNs are distributed matters and that 
there are significant differences that will result based upon how a PN distribution 
protocol is designed. Our protocol transmitted a third more PNs and as such we believe it 





Figure 53.  Final results of baseline PN distribution protocol vs. our PNDP. 
6.3 Comparison of Results to Other Published Methods 
At present, no other PN distribution technique’s implementation details have been 
presented for a side-by-side comparison of performance. However throughout the 
literature there are other protocols that have been presented that meet aspects of the 
various requirements of VANETs and these, as well as our own, are as summarized in 
Table 24 [46-50, 65, 150-152].  
Authentication and privacy refer to the definitions of Section 2.2. By 
centralization, we refer to whether the management is centrally organized or distributed 
with a preference for centralization given the need for government oversight of vehicular 
networks. Sparsity refers to whether the method can work under conditions with few 
vehicles, little infrastructure, and minimal contact. For example, a method can handle 
sparsity if two vehicles who have never seen each other and with no external 
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infrastructure present can securely communicate. A Dynamic trust model is one in which 
the system can adjust to change – such as a car experiencing electrical failures that result 
in sending false information. Our method relies on CRLs and the renewal process to 
achieve dynamism. Given the large scale of VANETs, the need for any system that 
provides security to scale is necessary. Our method achieves this through RAs and 
regions. Confidence refers to how much trust one can put in the system itself. Our 
method is grounded in the principles of public key infrastructure and is equally secure. 
Thus communications can be comparatively trusted if the sender’s certificate has been 
signed by the CA. Finally, robustness is a measure of how a trust system can withhold 
attacks, such as a Sybil Attack. Reputation based systems are quite vulnerable to these, 
but PKIs when properly implemented greatly reduce the ability for identity fraud and are 
inherently secure. 







































Benin x x x x x x x x
Chen x x x x x
Dotzer x x
Gerlach x x x x x x
Golle x x x x
Ma x x x x x x
Minhas x x x x x
Patwardhan x x x







The purpose of this research was to devise a unified method for the distribution of 
pseudonyms in ephemeral hybrid vehicular networks. Our research has resulted in the 
development of a pseudonym distribution protocol that takes into consideration the many 
relevant factors without compromising the security or privacy of pseudonym users. Our 
approach is scalable, adaptive, and bandwidth efficient and should prove to help pave the 
way to networked vehicles. The ultimate result we hope this research contributes to is 
safer roads with fewer vehicle accidents, injuries, and deaths. 
7.2 Future Work 
This work provides insight to the problem of pseudonym distribution through the 
use of simulation. The next step would be to further validate these results through the use 
of either full scale vehicles or micro-scale models. In this way VANETs can be validated 
as providers of augmented information to drivers and vehicle electronic control systems, 
such as dynamic laser cruise control. 
Furthermore, with adequate solutions for both PN distribution and revocation now 
attained, implementing a VPKI complete with CAs, RAs, PNs, and OBUs to gain insight 
in the interaction of the total VPKI system is possible. In doing so, additional insights are 
likely to be gained and additional ideas on how to improve a VPKI would be generated. 
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Finally, with autonomous vehicles becoming a reality and now legal in both 
Nevada and California, integrating networked vehicles with autonomous vehicles is 
bound to be the future of independent small group transportation. Ultimately we predict 
that the first major Segway into our roadways will be the replacement of High Occupancy 
Vehicle (HOV) lanes with Networked-Autonomous Vehicle (NAV) lanes that will 
provide for safer, faster, and more environmentally friendly travel. Individual NAVs will 
join in close proximity in building a customized technological mass transit system that, 
combined with improvements in alternative energy, will bring to the market tremendous 
gains in freedom of movement and one day achieve the goals of the Intelligent 
Transportation System conceived over 40 years ago. The future is both promising and 
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